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Kybernetika 
On Bargaining in Games 
M I L A N M A R E Š 
ACADEMIA 
PRAHA 
The presented paper deals with the problems of bargaining in coalition-games with side-pay-
ments. The autor's aim is to bring a survey of situations which can be described by such games, 
and to suggest a general game-model, including all modifications of the basic situation. In such 
a general model, including, e.g., even the possibility of information about the intentions of anti-
players, the process of bargaining is investigated, and the expected behaviour of players is descri-
bed. This attitude, which enables us to explain and forecast, on the base of adequate general 
model, the behaviour of players, is in [10] called the prediction of the bargaining. We keep this 
term here as well. 
The model of game proposed in this paper includes a wide scale of conflict situations. Not 
only the process of coalitions forming, as well as the process of side-payments bargaining, is 
considered here. The investigated type of game includes also the possibility of electing strategies 
for all coalitions, and, moreover, according to this model each coalition is able to obtain some 
information (incomplete, may be) on the designs of the anti-coaliton. The proposed model may 
be applied, as shown in the conclusive part of this work, even in the case of non-cooperative 
games. The results for two-player games are comparable with the classical ones. 
The model suggested here is rather general for obtaining more than the fundamental results. 
But, it can be specified for many special situations, for which, according to additional assump-
tions, some interesting results can be obtained. Some of these special types of games are briefly 
investigated in this work, as well. 
The paper is divided into four parts. The first of them introduces the general model of game 
with its fundamental and obvious properties. The second part deals with the bargaining model 
in such general game. For simplifying the explanation and the notation, the model is defined for 
a special type of games with exactly one possible strategy of each admissible coalition. The third 
part of the work is oriented to special type of games with no information about the intentions 
of anti-players. 
The bargaining model suggested in the second part, can be applied without changes even to the 
general coalition-games with more than one strategy of any coalition. This fact is shown in the 
fourth part of this paper. In such a case also the investigation of games with fixed coalitions, and 
the prediction of strategies only, has its sense, and it is also investigated in the fourth part. 
Finally, the application of the suggested model to the two-player games is presented. 
The presented paper will be divided into a few volumes of the journal, and, consequently, it is 
reasonable to introduce here some basic information, important for the simplier orientation in 
the text, even if it ought to be traditionally located in the closing parts of the paper. First of all, 
the list of parts and paragraphs is included. 
Part I. A General Coalition-Game 
0. Descriptive Introduction 
1. Notations 
2. Coalition-Game with Finite Identification 
3. Further Notions and Properties. 
4. Special Types of Games 
Part II. Bargaining in a Game without Choosing Strategies 
5. Auxiliary Relations-
6. The Bargaining Prediction 
Part III. Bargaining without Identification 
7. Special Properties of Bargaining Model 
8. Bargaining in Three-Player Games without Identification 
Part IV. Strategies in Bargaining 
9. Extended Bargaining Model 
10. Strategies in Games without Identification 
11. Games with a Fixed Cooperation 
12. Two-Player Games 
A few Remarks on Bargaining Models. 
The notation used in this paper, is generally consistent in all parts. However, some generaliza-
tions and simplification of the basic model cause also some simplifications of used symbols, 
applied in some parts of the work. For the better reading of all parts we introduce here also the 
list of important symbols used in the text. 
Symbol 
N 







/ , x, <e, Jt, . 
J, K,L,M, ... 
AK, SK, Sx 





C = C(X, s, D) 
k 












I 2 set of players 
2 class of all coalition structures 
2 coalition structures 
2 coalitions 
2 sets of strategies 
2 strategies 
2 strategic structure 
2 set of strategic structures 
2 identification partition and 
identification set 













C = C(Ж, D) 11 
introduction 
(K,DK) introduction 
CЪC mod c II 5 
C r a t 5 (Definition 1) 
C dom C mod c 5 (Definition 2) 
C Dom C mod c 5 (Definition 4) 
C P C, ф * 11 6 (Definition 6) 
C p C, sp** 6 (Defìnition 7) 
* r 6 (Definition 8) 
^ г a t 6 class of all configurations being 
of rational character 
w III 7 
UГ 7 
Уţ*(A), Уf*(B) IV 9 (Definition 2A, 2B) 
*к IV 10 
C(s, D) IV.11 
H IV 12 
s* 12 maximin vector 
* i 12 (compare Part I, sec. 3) 
Finally, even if it is not usual, we introduce here also the list of references used in the work. 
It ought to simplify the reader's orientation in them without expecting the publication of the 
last part of the work. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Aumann, R. J., Maschler, M.: The Bargaining Set of Cooperative Games. Annals of Math. 
Stud. (1964), 52, 443-476. 
[2] Harshanyi, J. C : A Bargaining Model for the Cooperative и-person Game. Annals of Math. 
.Stud. IV (1959), 40, 323-335. 
[3] Kuhn, H. W.: An Algorithm for Equilibrium Point in Bimatrix Games. Mathematics, 47 
(1961), 1657-1671. 
[4] Lemke, C. E., Howson, J. T.: Equilibrium points in Bimatrix Games. J. Soc. Indust. Appl. 
Math. 12 (1964), 2. 
[5] Luce, R. D., Raifia, H.: Games and Decisions. J. Wiley and Sons, London—New York 
1957. 
[6] Myiassava, K.: The л-person Bargaining Game. Annals of Math. Stud. (1964), 52, 577—626. 
[7] von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O.: Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. Princeton 
1947. 
[8] Vorobjev, N. N.: Situacii rovnovesija v bimatričnych igrach. Teor. verojat i prim. /// (1958), 
3, 318-331. 
[9] Vorobjev, N. N.: O koalicionnych igrach. Doklady AN SSSR, 124-1 (1959), 253-256. 
[10] Winkelbauer, K : Strategické hry. Kybernetika 3—4 (1967—68), supplement. 
[11] Mareš, M.: Stability of Coalition Structures and Imputations in Coalition-Games. Kyber-
netika 10 (1974), 6, 462-490. 
PART I: GENERAL COALITION-GAME 
0. Descriptive Introduction 
In the following section some ideas are given, intuitive in their nature, on which 
the investigated model of conflict situation, as well as the proposed prediction 
method, is based. 
The basic notion in this paper is that of game, defined in the section 2 as a quin-
tuple, containing the following parts: a set of players, a class of the admissible coali-
tion structures, a class of the sets of coalition strategies, a collection of coalition 
identification-partitions and a class of pay-off functions of the players. 
With the exception of the identification-partitions these notions are well-known 
and used in the literature (as an admissible coalition structure a partition of the set 
of players into disjoint admissible coalitions is meant). 
The notion of an identification-partition of a given admissible coalition is based 
on the intuitive imagination, that every coalition is able to obtain, during the pro-
cess of bargaining, some information, greater or smaller, about the anti-players' action 
and, in this way, also an information about the expected pay-off, following from 
the negotiated cooperation. This gives a possibility for the participants of the coali-
tion to react more sensitively on the arisen situations in the game and to obtain, 
in such a way, a higher profit. 
In its nature, the mechanism of the identification lies in the fact, that for every 
admissible coalition a partition of the set of all game situations in which the coali-
tion can occur (i.e. the set of all coalition structures, containing this coalition, with 
their vectors of strategies) into a finite number of subsets is defined, supposing that 
the members of the coalition are able to decide, in every stage of the process of 
bargaining, in which among these subsets the form of cooperation, negotiated in 
this moment, can be found. 
We suppose, in the presented paper, that the particular parts of a game satisfy 
the following game postulates: 
players: 
— the set of players is non-empty and finite; 
coalition structures: 
— the class of admissible coalition structures is always 
non-empty and finite, 
— every coalition structure, composed from admissible 
coalitions is admissible in the considered game; 
strategies: 
— every admissible coalition has a non-empty set of strategies to its disposal, 
— supposing a new coalition is formed by the union of a number of smaller coali-
tions, then this new coalition has to its disposal at least all the strategies, the 
former coalitions had before their union; 
identification-partitions: 
— an admissible coalition does not change its information about the anti-players 
action supposing it changes only its strategy, 
— supposing a new coalition is formed by the union of a number of smaller coali-
tions, also the information of particular of the coalition about the anti-players 
are united; 
pay-off functions: 
— supposing a new coalition is formed by the union of a number of smaller coali-
tions, the whole pay-off of its members is at least the same as the total of the 
whole pay-offs of the members of the former coalitions. 
As we suppose that the members of the coalitions are allowed to support the good-
will of their partners to cooperate with them by the side payments, the former 
postulates can be enriched by the following side payments postulates: 
— the side payments are negotiated during the process of bargaining, they are 
supposed to be fixed amounts, independent from the actualy obtained final pay-
offs of the players; 
— the side payments are given to members of a coalition by another members of the 
same coalition from the private means of the later. 
In its nature, the bargaining prediction is based on the idea that the game consists 
of two stages. In the first stage the players are looking for suitable coalitions, negotiat-
ing the possible common strategies and offering side payments. It is possible that a 
negotiated form of cooperation is changed supposing there occur some other, more 
suitable, ones. In some stage the negotiation process is finished by the formation 
of a negotiated form of cooperation and the second stage of the game occurs, in 
which the definitively negotiated coalitions use their strategies having been negotiated 
before. After the pay-offs are obtained, the members of the coalition pay to each 
other the side payments having promissed before. 
This serial deals with the first stage of the game, with the bargaining, supposing 
that as the form of cooperation (obtained in every stage of the process of bargaining) 
a triple is considered, containing a coalition structure, a vector of strategies of its 
coalitions and a matrix, representing the negotiated side payments. Those triples 
are called configurations. 
There is the goal of the prediction to find such a relation, or system of relations, 
on the class of all admissible configurations, which would enable to choose a non-
empty sub-class of possible and, from the point of view of the players, acceptable 
results of bargaining. It is useful, moreover, to clasify the elements of the sub-class 
obtained in such a way, at least roughly, into several groups, according to their 
stability, i.e. according to the measure, in which they reflect the interests and possi-
bilities of the players. 
Such a procedure is proposed in sections 5 and 6, and generalized in section 9. 
The basic quantity, which gives the motivation for the action of the players during 
the bargaining and which must be investigated during the bargaining prediction is 
the guaranted profit of the players. It is defined, for every player, as a function on 
the class of all admissible configurations and represents the sum of the expected 
payment of the player, under the given form of cooperation in the coalition and 
under the given information about the action of the anti-players, with the negotiated 
side payments. 
In order we were able to predict effectively the process and result of the bargaining 
in a given game, some degree of rationality must be ascribed to the players, rationa-
lity, which gives motivation to the players' action during the whole process of bar-
gaining. These requests can be formulated, following the paper [10], in the postulates 
on rationality and motivation: 
— the given game is known correctly to every player, i.e. he knows the quintuple 
defining it, 
— a player accepts an offer to cooperate with a coalition, supposing this cooperation 
guarantees to him at least such guaranteed profit he had before this offer, 
— a player prefers the result of bargaining, guaranteeing him the highest profit with 
no respect to the other players, 
— a coalition prefers one result to another supposing that at least some members 
of this coalition prefer this result and that there are no members prefering the 
other result to the first. 
1. Notations 
A great deal of notions and symbols used in this paper are those usually used in the 
elementary set theory and theory of functions. Only the following notations need for 
special remark. 
The symbol N denotes the set of all natural numbers. 
For neJV, the n-dimensional Euclidian space is caaled, for the sake of shortness, 
n-space. 
The symbol {m : m has the property P} denotes the set of all the elements having 
the property P; {m} denotes the one-element set containing exactly the element m; 
{mu m 2 , . . . , m„} = {mr}r=1>...>u 
is the finite set the only elements of which are mu m2, ..., m„. 
If M 4= 0 is a set and Ji is a disjoint class of its non-empty subsets such that 
U L = M, then Jt is called a partition of the set M. If J T , J5? are two partitions 
of the same set M 4= 0 such that for every set L e i ? there is a set K e Jf so that 
Lcz K, then j§? is called a subpartition of Jf. 
(\.\) Let J{ be a partition of a finite non-empty set M, let a square matrix DL = 
= (d\J
,))ieLJeL of real numbers be defined for every subset Le J4. Then the 
square matrix D = (dy) f e M J s M such that 
dij = d\f for all Le ^//, i e L, j e L, and 
dy = 0 for ie K, jeL, Ke J4, Le J4, K 4= L, 
is denoted by D = (DL)LeM. 
For every finite set M, 7t(M) e JY denotes the cardinal number of the set M. 
(1.2) For every non-empty class Ji of sets the symbol \J(\ denotes the set U M. 
MsJt 
In similar way, for every collection M of classes of sets the symbol II/Ml denotes 
the class U <^t-
J(eM 
(1.3) For every finite non-empty set M the symbol S(M) denotes the set of all trans-
formations s of the set M into the set of all real numbers such that for all 
m e M is 0 = s(m) S 1 and £ s(m) = 1. 
msM 
(1.4) If Mt, i = 1, ..., r are finite non-emty sets, if M = X Mt is a Cartesian 
i = i 
product, if s e S(M), s(i)eS(Mi), i = I, .... r, then we write s = s
(1) x 
x s(2) x . . . x *(r), supposing that for every m = (mx, m2, ..., mr)eM 
s(m) = nj ( i )(ff l i ) . 
;= I 
(1.5) By stm], me M, the transformation from s(M) is denoted, which satisfies the 
conditions: 
slm\m) = 1 , s[m](m') = 0 , m' eM , m' + m . 
2. Coalition-Game with Finite Identification 
Let J be a finite non-empty set. Let K be a non-empty collection of the partitions 
of the set / , satisfying the condition: 
(2.1) If j r . , . . . , j f„ e K, if J f is a partition of / , and if for every set K e tf is K e 
e U JC , then , f e K . 
Let K e ||K|, let a finite non-empty set AK be given such that 
(2.2) For J (1 ) , ..., J(n) e ||K|, J ( r ) n J ( , ) = 0 for r 4= t, r = 1, ..., n t = 1, ..., n, 
U J ( r ) = K e || K || 
r = l 
the inclusion 
AK => X AJ(r> 
r = l 
holds. 
Let be ascribed, to every set AK, Ke ||K|, the class of transformations SK = S(AK), 
satisfying (1.3). 
If X e K then we denote by Sx the Cartesian product 
X SK ; if s = (sK)KeX e Sx , 
KeX 
then the set of pairs 
{K,sK):KeX, s = (sK)KeX} 
is denoted by the symbol (X, s). By Ks we denote the class of sets 
{(X, s):XeK,seSx}. 
To every set K e |K||, a partition 0tK of the class Ks into finite number of subclasses 
is ascribed, satisfying the following conditions: 
(2.3) If (X, s) e Ks, (X, s') eKs,s = (sL)LeX, s' = (s'L)LeX, ifKeX, and sL = s'L 
for LeX, L 4= K, then (X, s) and (jf, s') belong to the same set R e MK. 
(2.4) If J ( 1 ) , . . . , J ( n )e| |K|!, J^nJlt) = ^) for r * t, r = 1, ..., n, f = l , . . . , n , 
U J ( r ) = K e | | K | , 
r = l 
if (X, s) e Ks, (X', s') eKs,Ke X, J
( r ) e X', r = 1, ...,n, s = (sL)LsX, s' = 
= (S'J)JSX; 
(X,s)n(X',s') = (X,s)-{(K,sK)}, 
if sets R E S&K, R{r) e 01^, r = 1, ..., n are given, so that (X, s) e R, (X', s') e 
e2?(r) r = 1, ..., n, then 
1? = 0 {(*"", *") : (*"•, s") e Ks, s" = (s"L)Leyr, K e X", (((X", s") -
r = l 
-{(K,a)^(u{(j(r),s;<o)}))6jR(r)}; 
t = l 
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if it is the case, we write, abbreviately: 
R = Comp{R(r); r = 1, ..., n} . 
Finally, let be ascribed, to every iel, a bounded realvalued function vt defined 
on the set of all triples 
(K,sK.RK), ieKe\\K\\, sKeSK, RKe0tK, 
satisfying the conditions: 
(2.5) If 
J (1 ) , ..., J ( n ) e |K|| , (J J ( r ) = Ke\\K\\, 
r = l 
j C - ) n J
( , ) = 0 for r * t, r = l,...,n, t=l,...,n, 
if 
sKeSK, s(r)eSJ(r), r = l,...,n, 
SK = s(l) X . . . X S(n) 
(c.f. (1,4)), and if 
RKemK, R(r)e^J(,> , r = l,...,n, RK = Comp {R(r); r = 1, ..., n} , 
then the inequality 
£ v&K, sK, RK) = £ £ v,(J", s(t), R(t)) 
ieK ! = 1 ieJd 
holds. 
Then the ordered quintuple 
r = (i, K, {sK}Ke]m, {®K}Keim, {vt}ieJ) 
is called a coalition-game with finite identification. According to the usual inter-
pretation, the following terms are used for its particular components. 
The set / is the set of players, its partitions are called coalition structures and the 
collection K is called a collection of admissible coalition structures. The sets K c I 
belonging to ||K|| are called coalitions (or admissible coalitions) and the trans-
formations sK 6 SK are called strategies (or mixed strategies) of the coalition K. The 
partition MK is called identification partition of the coalition K and the ascribed 
sets RK e 3$K are called identification sets of the coalition K. The sets (jf, s) e Ks 
are called strategic structures and the functions i>;, i el, are called pay-off functions 
of the players. 
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3. Further Notions and Properties 
It can be useful to concern our attention to several elementary properties of the 
particular components of a strategic coalition-game with finite identification and to 
introduce several other notions serving to the description of the development and 
result of the process of bargaining in a game. In whole the rest of this section, we shall 
consider a given game 
r = (i,K,{sK}K5im, {*K}bm, {vt}ieI). 
Remark 3.1. If K e ||K|, X 6 K, then the sets SK and s^ are closed convex poly-
hedra in the 7i(AK)-space and in the ( J] 7r(AL))-space. 
Remark 3.2. It can be easily seen, that a transformation q>t can be ascribed to every 
player i e J, such that to every strategic structure (X', s) e Ks the triple (K, sK, RK), 
where jKe |K| | , sK e SK, RKeJ%K, satisfying ieK, (K,sK)e(X, s), (X,s)eRK, 
is ascribed. Then the composed transformation vt((pi) of the class Ks to the set of all 
real numbers can be defined for every i e I in such a way that 
vi((Pi(X,s)) = vi(K,sK,RK), 
9i(X, s) = (K, sK, RK) • 
As there is no danger, in the following of misunderstanding between the strategic 
structure (X, s) and the triple (K, sK, RK) = cpt(X, s), we shall write 
vt(X, s) = vt(K, sK, RK) 
for vt((pt(X, s)), iff (K, sK, RK) = cpt(X, s). This symbolization makes some pro-
cedures, used below, more simple. 
Remark 3.3. In literature, such games are often investigated, in which the pay-off 
functions of players are considered to be real-valued functions hh i e / , defined 




(3.1) If s = (sK)Ke*z
s*> t h e n f o r a" ieI 
his)- x nw%)^«. 




•&W = 0 , < e 4 , 4 * aK, KeJfT 
(c.f.(1.5)). 
In such a case the formerly introduced functions vh i e / may be interpreted as the 
expected value of the pay-off under the given vector of strategies s and under the 
given information of the players about their anti-players action; e.g. «, may be derived 
from A; by the relation: 
(3.2) If (jf, s) e Ks, (K, sK) e (X, s), (jf, s) e i?K, i e K, then 
i>;(K, - „ RA.) = v{c€, s) = 
= inf {A;(s') : s' e Sx, (jf, s') e RK,s/, = SK) . 
In such a case the condition (2.5) is satisfied (being a consequence of (2.6)), even the 
more strong form holds: 
vt(K, sK, RK) ^ v,(J
M, s(!), R(t)) for all i e J
w <= K, 1 g f ^ n . 
In the case of necessity the function u; can be chosen even in a less pesimistic way 
than that described in (3.2), according to an actual interpretation. The condition 
(2.5), however, should be satisfied in every case. 
In order to obtain a complete description of the bargaining, the introduction of 
another notions may be useful, in the first order the notion of side payments, des-
cribed, in heuristic way, in Section 0. 
If Ke ||K||, then a matrix DK = (dffi)ieKt}eK of real numbers, satisfying 
d^ = -df,ieK,jeK, 
is called side payments matrix in K. Analogously, if Jf e K, and if for every K e Jf 
the side payments matrix DK is given, then the matrix 
D = (DK)KeX 
(c.f. (1.1)) is called side payments matrix in Jf. The symbols £?K and 3)x denote 
the sets of all side payments matrices in K and in Jf. 
If Ke\\K\\, sKeSK and DK e 2>K, then the triple 
(K, sK, DK) 
is called an agreement. 
If j f e K, s = (sK)KeX eSx, D = (DK)KeX e ®x, then the set 
C = {(K,sK,DK):Kejf} 
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is called a configuration; also the symbol 
C = C(jf, s, D) 
will be used. By # the class of all configurations, admissible in the considered game, 
will be denoted. 
If JfeK, if k c Jf, k # Jf, if C = C(jf, s, D) e <if , 
then the set 
c = {(X, 5K, DK) : (X, % , Z)K) eC,Kek} = c(C; k) 
will be called a sub-configuration of the configuration C. 
For every player i e 7, a real-valued function J f f can be defined on the class <€ by 
the relation 
(3.3) *,.(C) = *tX, s) + Y di} = 
= vt(K, sK, RK) + £ dtJ 
where 
C = C(jf, s, D) , ieKeJf, (jf, s) e RK e 0tK , 
- = (sL^ssr 6 s>r • 
This function x ; will be called the profit of the player i. 
(3.4) For every Mai, C e f , C G <£ the symbol 
* M ( Q > xM(C) 
denotes that 
Xj(C) ^ Xj(C) for all j e M, and, 
*,(C) > A:;(C) for some i e M. 
Remark 3.4. If (X, s) e Ks, (jf', s) e Ks, K e X n Jf', and if the equality 
, £ ,,{/,s) = X vt*', s') 
IEK ieK 
holds, then there exists, for every configuration C = C(jf, s, D) e # , such a C = 
= C'(jf', s', D') e ^ , that 
x,.(C) = Xi(C) 
14 
for all ieK. It is sufficient, for this purpose, to choose D' = (d'ij)ieIje[ e Qx. in 
such a way that 
d'u = (K(K))-
1 . (Xi(C) - v{X', s') + Vj(X', s') - Xj(C)), 
ieK,jeK. 
Lemma 3.1. If C = C ( X ' , $', D') e c6, (jf, s) e Ks, then there exist D e ® j r a n d C = 
= C(X, s,D)e% such that 
*K(C) > xK(C) 
if and only if 
(3.5) Yjv{X,s)>^xi(C). 
ieK ieK 
Proof . Supposing the inequality (3.5) holds for K e Jf, then it will be sufficient, 
for our purposes, to choose 
D = (DL)LaX e 9X , DK = (d<if%KJeK , 
df = « K ) ) - . (,;(C) - ,fX, s) + , , /X, s) - *,(C)) , 
ieKJeK. 
Then ^ f = -djf>, i e K , j e K, and 
*;(C) = P i (X, s) + £ d<f = t. ;(X, s) + < K ) . ((TT(X))-
1 . x(,.(C) -
- v{x,.)) + ft*))--. (£ ./jr. s) - £ Xj(c)) = 
= Xi(c) + «x))--. (x ,/jr, s) - £ ^c)) > Xi(c) 
JeK jeK 
for i e K. Therefore 
XK(C) > XK(C) . 
The reverse implication follows immediately from (3.4) • 
4. Special Types of Games 
A coalition-game may take various special forms, the investigation of which may 
be interesting in the following. 
Supposing the collection K contains exactly one admissible coalition structure, 
the game is called a game with fixed cooperation. 
Supposing for every pair J f e K, JSP e K, Jf" is a subpartition of i ? or i? is a sub-
partition of Jf, the game is called a game with strictly bounded cooperation. 
Supposing K contains all the a priori possible partitions of the set /, the game is 
called a game with free cooperation. 
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Supposing for every coalition Ke ||K|] the set SK contains exactly one strategy 
(i.e. supposing all the sets AK, Ke |K[| contain exactly one element), the game is 
called coalition game with no choice of strategies, or, abbreviately, coalition-game. 
Supposing for every coalition Ke \\K\ the identification partition 0lK contains 
exactly one identification set 
RK = {{#, -) : (J r , s) eKs,KeX}, @K = {RK} , 
the game is called a game without identification. 
In Section 2, the investigated model of game was defined to be a game with finite 
identification, i.e. to be a game in which all the identification partitions 0lK, Ke\K\ 
are finite. This definition includes all the cases of games with no choice of strategies. 
In case such games are investigated, that their sets of strategies contain more elements, 
even games with infinite identification partitions can be considered, and the pre-
sumption of a finite identification seems to be a limitation. We can see, however, 
considering the limited possibilities of recognizing of real players, that the games 
with finite identification contain a substantial part of all real coalition-games. More-
over, the apparatus developed in the case of the coalition-games can be applied in 
the case of the games with finite identification, what would not be possible in the case 
of the coalition games with generally infinite identification. Further discussion of 
this subject c.f. in Conclusive remarks. 
PART II. BARGAINING IN A GAME WITHOUT CHOOSING 
STRATEGIES 
This part, the most important of the presented paper, introduces the idea of bar-
gaining solution in the investigated type of game. For the simplification of notations 
and for easier reading of proofs, the bargaining model is introduced here for a special 
case of games with exactly one strategy in each coalition. It will be shown in the 
fourth part of this paper, that the restriction is not essential, and that it does not 
influence the generality of obtained results. 
The simplification of the investigated game model enables us to simplify the nota-
tions introduced above. In this part 
T = (/, K, {SK}Kem, {®K}Keim, {»<}«) 
is considered to be a coalition-game and we shall use the notation (K, DK) (resp. 
C(3C, D)) for agreements (resp. configurations) instead of (K, sK, DK) resp. C(jf, s, D). 
Every strategic structure (jf", s) e Ks is unambiguously defined by the relevant coali-
tion structure X e K, and the identification partitions of the coalitions then can be 
understood as partitions of the collection K of all the admissible coalition structures. 
The condition (2.3) is satisfied automatically, in this case, and the condition (2.4) 
can be formulated in the form: 
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If J ( 1 ) , . . . , J ( n )e| |K| | , 
( JJ ( r ) = K e | K | | , 
r = l 
jfr) n J ( , ) = 0 for r 4= t, r = 1 , . . . . n, t = 1, ..., n, j f e K, WeK, KejT, 
J ( r ) e 5F for r = 1, ..., n and if R e ^ and 7?(r) e #,<,,, r = 1, ..., n then 
1? = 0 {•*"' : J T e K , K e X', ( (X ' - {K}) u ( U {J(r)})) 6 i?(r)} . 
r = l 1 = 1 
Every game without choosing strategies is automatically a game with finite indenti-
fication. 
In a similar way, the pay-of functions vh i e I, are functions of only two variables. 
K and RK, ieKe \\K\\, RKe 0lK. According to Remark 3-3, the pay-off functions 
«;, i 6 / , can be defined also on the collection K when the relation vt(jf) = vt(jf, s), 
JfeK, (X, s) e Ks is used. 
5. Auxiliary relations 
The purpose of the following section is to introduce several notions which can be 
useful when a bargaining model is introduced. The most important among them is 
that of rationality and the strong domination relation (definitions 1 and 4). The 
other relations, introduced in this section, have purely preliminary character, and 
serve to a preliminary analysis of agreements and configurations. 
Let us introduce, at the first time, the following symbol: 
(5.1) If CeW, C eW, if c c C n C is their sub-configuration, if there exists an 
agreement (K, DK) e C — c satisfying the relation xK( C) > xK( C), then we 
shall write 
C 8 C mod c . 
Remark 5.1. It follows from Lemma 3.1 that for no configurations C = C(jf, D), 
C = C(Jf, D') with the same coalition structure yf, and for no their sub-configura-
tion c c C n C the relation C 8 C mod c holds. 
Definition 1. Let us consider a C = C(jf, D)ecg. An agreement (K, DK)e C is 
called rational in C supposing there does not exist C e (€, such that 
C S C mod c(C; X - {K}). 
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By the symbol 
c
rat 
the set of all agreements rational in C will be denoted. 
Remark 5.2. It follows from (5.1) and from Definition 1 that if C = C(jf, D) e <€, 
(K, DK) e C — Crat then thre exist C e <€ and ( L , D'L) e Crat satisfying the relations 
CSC mod c(C;JT - {K}), xL(C) > xL(C), and L c K . 
Remark 5.3. If C = C($r, D) e <€, if there exists no J? e K, i f being a subpartition 
of JT, then if follows, from Definition 1, that C = Crat. 
Lemma 5.1. Let Jf e K, iC e tf, Let us denote by K(K) the collection 
K(K) = {<£ :<£eK, JSP n JT z> j f - {K}} . 
Let there exists a matrix D = (Z>L)L63r and a configuration C = C(jf, D) e"? such 
that (K, Z>K) e Crat. Then the inequality 
(5.2) ;i(K(K)) £ *l*) ^ I X m a x { £ - , ( / ) : L e / , / e K ( K ) } , 
isK SCeK(K)LeX,L^K ieL 
holds. 
Proof . Let (K, DK)e C = C(jf, D). Then (K,DK)e Crat if and only if for no 
<£ e K(K) and for no matrix D' e S ^ the relation CSC mod c(C; JT - {K}) holds 
for C = C(<£, D'). This condition is satisfied if and only if for all ££ e K(K) and 
for all Le <£, L c K the inequality 
2>,<C);> £ < < ? ) 
isL ieL 
holds, which is equivalent to the condition 
(5.3) £ *.(c) = max { E *<(c"): c" = C V> D " ) e »• / - W> *<e / } = 
ieL ieL 
= max { £ «,( / ) : / + K(K), L e / } 
ieL 
for all coalitions Ls<£, La K, and for all coalition structures <£ e K(K). 
Summarizing the inequalities (5.3) for all Lc K, Le<£ and <£ e K(K) gives the 
inequality (5.2). • 
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Corollary. If J f e K, K e X , then the last Lemma gives the following: 
(a) If K = {i}, i e/, then ® K is an one-element set, containing the zero matrix and 
the agreement (K, 0) is rational in C(jf, D) for every De 2/M. 
(b) If K = {i, j}, i el,je I, i # j , then there always exists a matrix D = (DL)LeX e 
e <&*• such that (K, DK) is rational in C(jf, D). 
(c) If n(K) = k, and if every coalition J c X i s admissible, i.e. J e |K| | , and if 
there exists D = ( D L ) L e 3 r e 3>x and C = C(X, D)e
(g such that (X, DK) e 
C r a t then 
^ " D E " ^ ) ^ Z n-u{Z»*0): 
\n — 1/ ieK Jc:K,Tt(J)=n ieJ 
: / s K , / n J f = X - { K } , J e / } 
for all e iV, 1 g n < fc. 
Definition 2. If C, C are admissible configurations, if c cz C n C is one of their 
sub-configurations, then we shall say that C weakly dominates C modulo c and write 
C dom C mod c 
if: 
(a) there exists an agreement (K,DK)e C r a t - c such that xK(C) > xK(C), and 
(b) there exists no C" e <g such that the conditions 
(Ы) c c C", 
(b2) C" r a, -
 c => era, - C • 
C"ra, - C Ф C r a , - C • 
(bЗ) if 
(«. Dк)єCrаt-c, xк(C)>xк(C 
then 
xк(C) > xк(C) 
would hold simultaneously. 
An agreement (K, DK) e Crat — c, satisfying the condition (a), is called to be active 
in the relation C dom C mod c. 
The weak domination relation, just defined, enables us to choose such a configura­
tions among all the configurations belonging to # and satisfying the condition 
C 5 C mod c for given C ' s ^ c c C, which can be seen, from the point of view 
of the participating players, as the most rational. 
19 
Lemma 5.2. Supposing C is an admissible configuration, c cz C one of its sub-
configurations, then there exists C e ? satisfying C 5 C mod c, iff there exist 
C" e <<? satisfying C" dom C mod c. 
Proof . Supposing CB<€, C C C, C e # , C 8 C mod c, let us denote by (K, Z)K) e 
e C - c the agreement satisfying xK(C) > xK(C). If (K, D'K) 4 Crat, C" = C"(jf", D") 
as well as an agreement (L, D'L) e Crat can be constructed (as a consequence of Re-
mark 5.2) such that x<e(C") > xL(C) and C" n C = C - {(K,DK)}, which 
implies xL(C") > xL(C) and C" 8 C mod c. It means that the set 
{(J, D'}): (J, Z>}) e C;at - c , ^ ( C ) > Xj(C)} 
is non-empty and C" e <€ can be chosen in such a way that the conditions of the 
latter part of Definition 2 were satisfied, so C" dom C mod c. The contrary implica-
tion in the assertion of this Lemma is an immediate consequence of Definition 2. 
• 
Remark 5.4. If C, C e <€, if c' cz c cz C n C are two of their sub-configurations, 
and if the inclusion c — c' cz Crat; holds, then, according to the Definition 2, 
C dom C mod c implies C dom C mod c' . 
In the following steps, let us go to the strong domination relation, which is, as 
said in the beginning of this section, the basic relation of the proposed prediction 
method. The significance of the strong domination relation consists in the fact, that it 
enables us to pass from the analysis of agreements or sub-configurations to considera-
tions involving the configurations as a whole. Therefore, it forms also the basis for 
the proper prediction relations defined on the class <€. 
A question can arise, namely, whether it is or is not possible to make the used 
procedure easier in the sense that the weak domination relation should be used only 
modulo the empty sub-configuration 0. It will be shown in the following example 
that such a simplification, applied to games not being the games without identifica-
tion, would lead to results, which could be hardly accepted. 
Example 1. A three-players game is considered, where 
i = {i,j,k}, K = {jt0,jri}, Xo = {{i},{i},{k}}, Jft = {{i},{j,k}}, 
^(x,) = vj($r0) = vk($r0) = o, 
v{ctr0) = vj(xt) = tjxt) = l . 
If 0 denotes the zero side-payments matrix then the relations 
C(jf 0, 0) dom C(tfh 0) mod 0 , 
C(jfh 0) dom C(jf o, 0) mod 0 
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hold simultaneously, nevertheless in the first relation the agreement ({i}, 0) is active only because 
of the fact that the players; and k have chosen a proceeding, which is extremally disadvantageous 
from their point of view, and contradicts the postulates on rationalism. 
Therefore, the introduction of the domination relations modulo a non-empty 
sub-configuration aims, at least, to limit such cases. 
Definition 3. If. 
(c(r)U 
is a finite sequence of admissible configurations, if 
c cr f\ C (r) 
r = l 
is one of their sub-configurations and if the relation 
C(r) dom C(r- n mod c , r-2,3,...,n 
holds, then we say that {C(r)}r=l n is a weak domination sequence modulo c from 
C n to C"\ 
Remark 5.5. It follows from Definition 3 that in case C, C, C" e <$, if c c C" n 
n C n C, and if there exist weak domination sequences modulo c from C to C 
and from C to C", then also a weak domination sequence modulo c from C to C" 
exists. 
Definition 4. If C, C are admissible configurations, if c c C n C is one of 
their sub-configurations, then we shall say that C strongly dominates C modulo c 
and write 
C Dom C mod c , 
if 
(a) there exists a weak domination sequence modulo c from C to C, and 
(b) there exists no weak domination sequence modulo c from C to C. 
Remark 5.6. It follows from Remark 5.5 and from Definition 3 that the strong 
domination relation modulo c is a partial ordering relation on the class 
{C: CeV, c c C} 
and that this relation is anti-reflexive, anti-symetric and transitive. 
Lemma 5.3. If C = C(jf, D) e <$, (K, DK) e C, c = c(C; Jf - {K}), then the 
following assertions hold: 
(1) If (K, DK) e Crat, then there exists no C e <£ such that 
C Dom C mod c , 
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and if for some C" e <€ the relation 
C 8 C" mod c 
holds, then also 
C Dom C" mod c 
holds. 
(2) If (K, DK)<= C - CTat then there exists no C" e # such that 
„ C Dom C" mod c , 
and always such a C e <$ exists that 
C Dom C mod c . 
Proof . If (K, DK) e Crat, then, according to Definition 1, there exists no C such 
that C 8 Cmod c. According to Lemma 5.2 and Definitions 2, 3, 4, there exists no 
C € # such that 
C Dom C mod c . 
On the other hand, if for some C" e <£ the relation 
C 8 C" mod c 
holds, then 
C dom C" mod c 
according to Definition 2. According to the foregoing step of the proof, there exists 
no C e ^ such that C dom C mod c, which implies, according to Definitions 3 and 4, 
that 
C Dom C" mod c . 
If (K, DK) e C — Crat, then, according to Definition 1 and Lemma 2, there exists 
C ' e ? such that 
C dom C mod c . 
As, at the same time, according to Definition 2, the relation 
C dom C" mod c 
holds for no C" e # , this implies that 
C Dom C mod c 
and that for no Cel, 
C Dom C" mod c 
holds. • 
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Even in the case of strong domination relation an analogy of Definition 3 can be 
formulated. 
Definition 5. If 
{c(r)U 
is a finite sequence of admissible configurations, if 
{c(r)U . - . 
is a finite sequence of their sub-configurations such that 
c(r) c Cr) n C ( r + 1 ) 
and 
C ( r+1} Dom C(r) mod c(r) for r = 1, 1, . . . , n - 1 , 
then we say that the pair 
{C ( r ) U ( . . . , B , {c
( r )} r = 1 „_. 
forms a strong domination sequence from C(1) to C(n). 
Remark 5.7. If C, C, C" e cg, if there exist strong domination sequences from C 
to C and from C to C", then also a strong domination sequence from C to C" exists. 
6. The Bargaining Prediction 
In the following section, the introduced relations will be used in order to construct 
a prediction method for searching for the possible bargaining results in a given game. 
As said above, we shall limit ourselves to a game r without strategies choosing, 
r = (/, K, {SK}Keim, {MK}mm, {l);}ieJ) , 
where all the sets SK, K e ||K| are one-element ones. The simplified notation, intro-
duced at the beginning of this part, will be used even in the following proceedings. 
There is the goal of this section to find a subclass, non-empty if possible, of the 
class <$, containing the acceptable bargaining results and, eventually, at least some 
rough distribution of the elements of this sub-class with respect to the measure of their 
acceptibility. 
The following procedure, analogous to Definition 4, seems to be the most natural. 
Definition 6. Supposing C, C are two admissible configurations, we say that C 
strongly predictionally avoids C and write 
C P C , 
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if: 
(a) there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C, 
(b) there exists no strong domination sequence from Cto C. 
If there exists, for an admissible configuration C, no C s (€ such that C P C, we shall 
say that C is strongly predictionally stable. By ty*< the s e t °f au" strongly predic-
tionally stable configurations of the game T will be denoted. 
Remark 6.1. The relation P is a partial ordering relation on the class CS; it is 
anti-reflexive, anti-symetric and transitive. 
The strong avoiding relation, defined in this way, and the strong predictional 
stability property is not, and cannot be, in the same measure appropriate for all 
types of games. In some cases, especially if games with a larger number of the admis-
sible coalitions, and with more complicated identification partitions are considered, 
the requests of Definition 6 for the predictional stability checking and for the validity 
of the strong predictional avoiding relation are too high. Therefore, it seems to be 
useful to consider the following modification of this relation. 
Definition 7. Supposing C = C(jf', D), C = C(jf ' , D) are two admissible configu-
rations, we say that C weakly predictionally avoids C and write 
C P C , 
if: 
(a) there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C, 
(b) there exist no side-payments matrices 
D1" = (-%-* e ®* , Df W W - e ®x 
and no adequate configurations 
O = C\X, O*) € V , Ctt = 0\tf', Dn) e <S 
satisfying the four following conditions: 
(bl) there exists a strong domination sequence from C to 0^_, 
(b2) there exists a strong domination sequence from Cft to O, 
(b3) (L,DL)eCrato(L,Dl) eOm, 
(b4) (j,D'j)eC'ialo(J,D»)eCZ, 
If there exists, for a configuration C e # , no C ' e ^ such that C P C, we say that C is 
weakly predictionally stable. By ty**, the class of all weakly predictionally stable 
configurations of the game r will be denoted. 
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The weak avoiding relation enables to neglect, when the prediction stability is 
checked, the various highs of the side-payments in a coalition structure, supposing 
it does not influence the bargaining rationality and the existence of the strong domina-
tion relations for configurations. It means that actually the forming of the coalition 
structures is investigated, and differences among the side-payments matrices are 
considered only from the point of view of bargaining rationality. The weak predictional 
stability requests less, in such a way, for the properties of configurations and for its 
own checking. 
Even in this case a question can arise, whether it is or is not possible to make 
the prediction method more simple, namely in the way we did not introduce the 
strong domination relation modulo a given configuration in the procedure, and 
we used instead it directly the weak domination relation modulo the same configura-
tion as before. 
Example 2. Let us consider the game described in Example 1, Section 1, let us denote 
C = C(3Th 0), C0 = C0(X0, 0) . 
Then there exists a weak domination sequence 
modulo c(C; {{/'}}) from C0 to C 
and, at the same time, there exists a weak domination sequence 
modulo 0 from C to C0 . 
The same holds, if 
C 
replaced by any other configuration 





then it follows, from Definition 2, that for no 
C" e <if and c <=. C 
he relation 
C dom C" mod c 
holds. 
It is clear, from Example 2, that the proposed simplification would make the con-
figuration C0 to be weakly as well as strongly predictionally stable, what in no way 
corresponds with the image of an acceptable bargaining result among rational 
players. 
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Example 3. Supposing the method described by Definitions 6 and 7 is used in order to predict 
the bargaining, in Example 2 we obtain 
rr* = yr = {C:C= C(jfh D), D = (0, D{m), ({;, k}, Dim) e Crat} = 
= {C:C = C(Xt, D), Xj(C) = 0 , xk(C) = 0} . 
The obtained result is consistent with the intuitive image on a rational bargaining and with the 
postulates on rationalism. 
We have shown that it was useful, when complicated games considered, to moderate 
our requests for predictional stability. On the other hand, when games with small 
number of players and with simple identification partitions are considered, it may 
be useful to strict the stability criterion in the following way. 
Definition 8. Supposing C is an admissible configuration we shall say that C is 
predictionally balanced if there exists no configuration C e # and no sub-configura-
tion c <= C such that 
C Dom C mod c , 
The class of all predictionally balanced configurations in a given game F will be denoted 
b y ^ r . 
Lemma 6.1. The classes of weakly and strongly predictionally stable configura-
tions as well as the class of predictionally balanced configurations satisfy the in-
clusions: 
<P* * = <p* =, <p r . 
Proof . If C P C then also C P C (by Definitions 6, 7). The inclusion $ * c $ r 
follows from Definitions 6, 8. D 
Lemma 6.2. Every weakly predictionally stable configuration contains at least one 
agreement which is rational in this configuration. 
Proof . If C e *% and Crat = 0, then there exists, according to Lemma 5.3, C e
 (€, 
c c C such that C dom C mod c. On the other hand, for no configuration C e # 
with Cj"at = 0 there exist C" e # , c c C , such that C dom C" mod c (it follows 
from Definition 2). Therefore, neither the relation C Dom C" mod c can hold. 
It follows, using Definition 7, that C P C, hence C $ <pr*. D 
Remark 6.2. It follows from Lemma 5.3 and from Definition 8, that if C e ^Sr, 
then C = Crat. 
The proposed prediction method cannot guarantee, when games with a general 
finite identification considered, that the weakly or strongly predictionally stable 
configurations will contain only agreements, rational in this configurations. The 
same occurs in the following example. 
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Example 4. Let us consider a six-players game 
r = (/, K, {5jc}K e l |K | | , {^K}KS\\K\\> {
Vi}iel) 
which is a game without strategies choosing. Let 
/ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} , 
and let 
f ijr OJT «sr <ijy oy/~ ~jr <^r ojy <^r \ 
— \JC i, Ji 2, *& 3, JL 4, «̂> 5, «^ 6' '-^ 7, ^ 8, <A 9J , 
where the admissible coalition structures and the corresponding values of pay-off functions 
are described by Table 1. The identification partitions of all admissible coalitions are such, that 
every identification set contains exactly one admissible coalition structure. 
Table 1. 
X »I "2 l 'з "4 "5 »6 
J ř , - {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}} 1 0 1 
í 
1 2 1 
*г = {{1. 2}, {3}, {4, 5, 6}} 1 1 0 1 0 1 
*3={{1},{2-3}>{4.5,6}} 0 1 1 1 0 1 
-Г 4 ={{1,2,3} , {4} , {5 ,6}} 1 2 
1 0 0 0 
ЛГ 5 -{{1,2,3},{4,5},{6}} 1 2 1 0 0 0 
^ 6 = { { І } , { 2 , 3 } , { 4 } , { 5 , 6 } } 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 ^ 7 = { { 1 , 2 } , { 3 } , { 4 } , { 5 , 6 } } 0 0 1 1 0 
Ж 8 = { { І } , { 2 , 3 } , { 4 , 5 } , { 6 } } 1 0 0 0 0 1 
^ 9 = { { 1 , 2 } , { 3 } , { 4 , 5 } , { 6 } } 0 0 | 1 0 0 1 
The class % of the admissible configurations can be divided into four disjoint sub-classes: 
^a = {C 
V„ = {C 
% = {c 
% = {c 
C = C(JTU D) e <ží} , 
c = c(jf, D) s <e, JIT - jf2, jť3}, 
C = C(,jf, D) e <€, X = J f 4, -^s} , 
C == \-\y£ , D ) £ 15, Crb = X g , J í y, Jř g, JÍC 9/ • 
Under the given pay-off functions, the bargaining process will proceed in such a way which can 
be considered to be in some measure cyklic; sooner or latter, the configurations belonging to the 
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classes 
»<5> ^y> ^a> /̂5> ^a> • • • 
will be bargained. 
The class of strongly or weakly predictionally stable configurations will contain configurations 
from all the four sub-classes (the configurations 
C(jfr,0), r = l,2, ..., 9 , 
for example). At the same time, the sub-classes 
contain no configuration consisting only of agreements rational in this configuration. 
The example just given shows to us, on the other hand, that this fact does not 
contradict the common idea of the bargaining. Not only the proposed prediction 
method but nor any other detailed analysis of the described game, insisting only 
in the quantitative values expressed by guaranteed pay-offs, is not able to decide 
to which among the four sub-classes the finally bargained configuration will belong. 
In order to be able to decide this question, we should have to suppose that the attitude 
of the players is motivated by something else than by the high of their profit, but 
this would contradict the postulates. 
It is possible, nevertheles, to impose on the weakly or strongly predictionally stable 
configurations some request for a rationality, originating from the presumption 
that in a configuration, which is a result of a bargaining process long enough, no 
agreement can occur, which would not be rational at least in some among of possible 
configurations. Just given Example 4 illustrates this consideration. After several steps 
of the bargaining process, any agreement, which occurs and is not rational in the 
bargained configuration, may be regarded as a "rest" of the previous steps of the 
bargaining. This fact justifies the introduction of the following definition. 
Definition 9. We shall say that an admissible configuration C = C(jf, D) is of 
rational character, if it is possible to find, for every agreement (K, DK) e C, some 
configuration C ' e ? such that (K, DK) e C'tat. The class of all configurations with 
rational character will be denoted by c€nV 
Now, we have introduced all the notions necessary to the description of the bar-
gaining result in a given game. 
Supposing r is a strategic coalition-game with finite identification and with side 
payments, without strategies choosing, then the triple 
0P?*r.<5?ra t ) <p*n<<?rat, <pr) 
is called a bargaining prediction characteristic in T. Its components are considered 
to be the classes of the possible bargaining results among rational players, shaded 
by degrees according to their stability in the considered game. 
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The prediction characteristic, introduced in such a way, is rather adequate to an 
intuitive idea about the behaviour of rational players in an actual game of the in-
vestigated type. 
Theorem 1. There exists, in every coalition-game F, at least one weakly predicton-
ally stable configuration being of a rational character, i.e. 
$?* n ^rat * 0 . 
Proof . Let us consider a coalition structure / e K t o which there exists n o l ' e K 
such that Jf is a sub-partition of f'. Then C(f, D) e <€tii for every matrix D e 3)$, 
hence ^ r a t =f= 0. 
Let us part the class <€ into a finite number of disjoint sub-classes 
<€(X)~{C:C= C(jf, D)e<?}, J f e K . 
Every of these sub-classes is parted again into 2*(X) parts #(co)(jf ), co = 1, 2, ..., 2 ,l(-r), 
such that for every pair (C, C) of configurations from the same sub-class <^('o)(jf), 
1 = co < 2 *




Now, let us choose a configuration Ct e <^rat. If Cx <£ <£**, then there exists C e <€ 
such that Cp Cj. If C e <<?„„ then we set C2 = C. If C £ <<?„„ then C2 e # r a t and a 
strong domination sequence from C to C2 may be constructed, hence, there exists 
also a strong domination sequence from Ct to C2. If C2 £ $**, then we can follow 
the same way. After a finite number of such steps either some C, e <%nX, t Si 2, will 
be found, such that C, e *$**, or a sequence {C(}(=1_ _„ will be constructed such that: 
C ( e ^ r a t , t = 1, ..., « ; 
there exists a strong domination sequence from C (_ t to C(, ? = 2, ..., n ; 
n < 3.2*(/). rr(K) ; 
there exists an index t(0) < n, such that C((0) and C„ belong to the same sub-class 
^(<a)(jf), Jf e K, l ^ f f l g 2*(X); and for every configuration C _ <_', for which 
a strong domination sequence from C„ to C exists, there exists also a configuration 
C in the strong dominantion sequence from C((0) to C„, C((0) =f= C 4= C„, such that 
C and C belong to the same sub-class (€(a\^'), of e K, 1 ^ co = 2 *
w . It means that 
for n o C e ^ the relation Cp C„ holds. • 
Before closing this part, some properties of the configurations with only one 
admissible agreement of all players will be mentioned. Supposing this agreement 
is rational, the prediction procedure will be substantially simplified. 
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Lemma 6.3. Supposing the coalition structure X j = {/} is admissible, Jf t e K, 
and C = C(tfu D) e <% then the two following assertions hold: 
(1) The following assertions are equivalent: 




(c) C e «m, 
(d) Ce <p r, 
(e) . Ce qj* 
(f) Ce ^**. 
(2) If C = Crat, if the relation CSC mod 0 holds for some C e V, then C<£ <p** . 
Proof . The both parts of the Lemma can be derived from the foregoing assertions 
ad definitions in the following way. 
The equivalence of the assertions (a) and (b) follows immediately from Definition 1 
and Lemma 3.L The assertion (c) is equivalent to (b), according to Definition 9. If 
C = Crat, then it follows from Lemma 5.3 that there exists no C e <6 such that 
C Dom C mod 0. Hence (d) follows from (b). According to Lemma 6.1, (e) follows 
from (d) and (f) follows from (e). If the agreement (/, D7) e C is not rational in C, 
then, according to Lemma 6.2, C f 9p**, hence (b) follows from (f). Therefore the 
relations 
( a ) o ( b ) o ( c ) , (b ) -» (d ) ->(e ) ->(£) ->(b) 
hold, and the first part of the Lemma is proved. 
If C = Crat and C 8 C mod 0 for some C e %, then, according to Lemma 5.3, 
C Dom C mod 0. On the other hand, according to the same Lemma, there exists no 
C" e <€ such that C" Dom C mod 0. Hence C p C, according to Definitions 5 and 7. Q 
PART III. BARGAINING WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION 
In the previous part of this paper, some general results concerning the proposed bargaining 
model were presented. It is possible to obtain some more detailed results, especially if we abstain 
from assumption of the identification possibility. This part is subjected to the model of bargaining 
in such coalition-games, in which no identification is possible. 
It means that we suppose, in all this part, the investigated game being a game without identifica-
tion as defined in section 4, The notations, introduced in the previous part of this paper, are 
generally kept even in this one. The slight modification of it, based on the simplification of the 
investigated game model, is introduced in the following section 7. 
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7. Special Properties of Bargaining Model 
Games without identification and without strategies choosing represent one 
possible special example of the coalition-games. They may be interpreted as such 
games, in which the players have no information about the bargained behaviour 
of their anti-players. According to their character, these games are in the most 
close connection with the games investigated in literature (e.g. [1; 2; 6]). 
Clearly, the impossibility of an identification simplifies, in a rather significant 
measure, the bargaining prediction in such games and enables, moreover, to simplify 
the used notation. If 
r = (i,K,{sK}Keim, {mK}Keim, {--,}«) 
is a coalition-game without identification and without strategies choosing, then for 
every coalition K e j| Kfl the set SK and the class 0tK are one-element sets. The pay-off 
functions »,, i e I, can be seen as if they were functions of only one variable K defined 
on the class {K :Ke\\K\\,ieK}. Instead of vt(K,sK, RK) or Vi(K,RK), we can 
write simply v{K), i e K, and v{K) = vt(jf), tfieKetf. 
Let us denote, for every coalition K e || Kfl, 
(71) «<*)= - !> . (*) . 
teK 
This function w has some properties of the coalition characteristic function, known 
from the literature (e.g. [1; 5; 7; 10] e.t.c). 
Remark 7.1. If C e c€, (K, DK) eC,DK = (dh)ieKjeK, if a game without an identifi-
cation is considered, then (K, DK) e Crat iff (K, DK) is rational in every configuration 
containing (K, DK). This holds iff there exists no L e fl Kfl such that 
where 
It follows that 
ЧI0>ľ *.<c) = LЧ<к) + I I«V 
iєL ieL iєL jeK 
LaK,K- L = (J Jr,Jr!лJt = (Ц, Jr є II K|| , 
г = l 
r - 1 , . . . , и , í = 1, ..., n, r ф ( , nєN. 
<íírat = {C: Cє<í?, C=Ctм}. 
Instead of the phrase "an agreement (K, DK) is rational in a configuration C" 
we can use the abbreviate form "an agreement (K, DK) is rational". 
Remark 7.2. It follows from Remark 7.1 that when the games without an identifi­
cation are considered, Definition 2 may be written in the following, simple, form: 
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If 
C e <$, C e ^ , c c C n C 
then 
C dom C mod c 
if and only if 
C?> C mod c and C — c <= C ra t. 
Remark 7.3. It follows from Remark 7.2 and from Lemma 5.3, that when the games 
without an identification are considered, then every weakly predictionally stable 
(hence, also every strongly predictionally stable) configuration C contains only 
rational agreements, i.e. 
*„..=, #* => % 
(compare with Remark 6.2). The bargaining prediction characteristic is then repre-
sented by the triple 
There are, besides the general assertion introduced in the foregoing sections, also 
some other assertions which are valid when the games without an identification and 
without strategies choosing are considered, and which simplify the prediction pro-
cedure. 
Lemma 7.1. Supposing the relation 
C Dom C mod 0 
holds for admissible configurations C, C e <& then also the relations C P C and 
C i «p* hold. 
Proof . The relation C Dom C mod 0 implies, according to Remark 7.2, the 
identity C = Crat. Suppose the relation C P C does not hold. If it is the case, there 
exists a strong domination sequence from C to C, denoted, for example, 
(C<r)}r=1 . , {C
('>}r=1 - - . 
such that 
Cl) = C, C(n) = C , C " ) D o m C < r - " m o d c ( r - 1 ) , r = 2, 3,. . . . , n . 
Then there exists, for every r = l , , . , , n - l a weak domination sequence modulo 
c(r) from C(r) to C ( r + 1 ) which will be denoted by 
fC'r)\ 
! > J ' = l m(r) ' 
Cd.r) = C(r) ^ C(m(r),r) = C ( r + 1 ) ^ r = 1, 2, . . . , « - 1 . 
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Remarks 7.1 and 7.2 imply that 
c«,r) = C(t,r) for a U r = 1 ; _ _ ^ _ > t = 1 ; . . ,7 m ( r ) > 
because C = Crat. It follows, according to Remark 5.4, that the sequence 
f C ( l , l ) C(2,l) C (m(l) - l , l ) C(!>
2) C (m(n- l ) - l ,n- l ) 
C(m(n-l) ,n- l) _ , CW = C ) 
is a weak domination sequence modulo 0 from C = C(1) to C = C(n). This result 
contradicts the assumption 
C Dom C mod 0 . 
Hence, the relations C P C and C $ ^3* hold. D 
Supposing r is a game without identification and with a strictly bounded coopera-
tion, then the relation between the predictional avoiding relation and the strong 
domination relation modulo 0 is closer. 
Lemma 7.2. If C and C are two admissible configurations in a coalition-game without 
identification and with strictly bounded cooperation, if C = Crat, and if C p C, 
then the relation C Dom C mod 0 holds. 
Proof. Supposing there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C, and 
if C = Crat then, according to Remark 7.2 and Remark 5.4, even a weak domina-
tion relation modulo 0 from C to C may be constructed. On the other hand, if 
C 4= Crat, no weak domination relation modulo 0 from C to C can exist. 
Let us suppose that C = Crat, and denote C = C(jf, D), C = C(jf ' , D'). As 
a game without an identification and with strictly bounded cooperation is considered, 
and as there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C, necessarily Jf' is 
a sub-partition of the coalition structure Jf, and Jf' 4= Jf. As C = Crat, no C" = 
= C"(jf", D") e <€ can exist such that ct" was a sub-partition of j f and C" 8 C mod 0. 
It means that 
C Dom C mod 0 . D 
Remark 7.4. In the following the symbol Q r may be useful for the following class 
of configurations 
(7.2) £!r = {C : Ce <6 , there exists no C ' e t such that C Dom C mod 0} . 
It follows, according to Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, that when a coalition-game without 
identification is considered, then ^8* c £.-. If the considered game, is moreover, 
a game with strictly bounded cooperation, then 
<P** = Q r => y * r . 
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Lemma 7.3. If C is a coalition-game without an identification, if C = C(jf, D) e <€, 
C = C(S£, D') e <€, if <e is a sub-partition of Jf, if c = c(C; k), c' = c'(C, k') so 
that \k\ — \k'\, if the equality xt(C) — Xj(C) holds for all i el, then the assertions 
(1) if C n c <= Crat then C n c' <= Crat, 
(2) supposing there exists C, e # such that C dom Cx mod c then there exists C2 e <̂  
such that C dom C2 mod c' and x,(C1) = xt(C2) for all i e I, 
(3) supposing there exists C2e<& such that C2 dom C mod c', then there exists 
Ct e # such that Ci dom C mod c, and xj(Ct) = x{(C2) for all i el, 
hold. 
Proof . The first assertion is an immediate consequence of Definition 1 and the 
assumptions-of this Lemma. The second one follows immediately from the first one, 
from Definition 2 (Remark 7.2), and from the assumptions, if we choose, for a given 
Cl e <$, such a C 2 e 1 , that C2 n C 3 c' and Cx n C2 => C, — c. The third assertion 
is an immediate consequence of the assumptions of this Lemma, of the relation 
(5.1), and of Lemma 5.2, if we choose, for a given C2 e <$, such a C , e ? , that Ct n 
n C => c and Cx n C2 =1 C2 — c'. • 
Theorem 2. Let us consider a coalition game E without an identification and with 
a strictly bounded cooperation. Denote by i f e K the coalition structure, for which 
any J f 6 K is a sub-partition of if. Then every configuration C e <€ is weakly pre-
dictionally stable if and only if it is predictionally balanced, and the bargaining 
prediction characteristic is defined by the relation 
%** = $ * = | r = Q r = 5 u i ' , 
where D r is defined by (7.2), 
& ={C : C = C(£e, D) e <?, C = Crat} , 
J* = {C : C = C(jf, D) e # , J f 4= Se, and there exists 
C e 2. such thatX;(C) = Xi(C)for all iel} . 
Proof. If C = C(<e, D), C = Crat, then there exists no C" e f a n d n o c c C n C" 
so that 
C" 5 C mod c . 
Therefore C e *Pr and 2. c 'ipr. If C e J ' then there exists C e J such that 
Xi(C) = Xi(C) for all t e J . 
If there exist C2 e <<?, c2 c C such that 
C2 8 C mod c2 , 
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then there exist, according to Lemmas 7.3 and 5.2, Ct e <$ and cx c C such that 
C j 8 C mod c1 . 
This relation contradicts the assumption C e J . Hence, if C e J2', then C e ^pr 
and 3! c <pr. So we have proved that 
? r 3 i U f . 
It is necessary to prove, moreover, that 
2 U 2' => ^5** . 
If C = C(Jz?, D) 6 # , C <£ J , then C # Crat and it follows, according to Remarks 
7.1 and 7.3, that C $ <p**. If C = C'(jf, D')eV, Jf # .Sf, C ' ^ J ' then either 
C =|= Crat and C <£ ""P**, or C = Crat and in such a case there always exists C = 
= C(j£?, 0 ) e # such that 
Xi(C) > JC,(C) for all i e J . 
If for some i e J the inequality 
x,{C) > xt{C) 
holds, then C 8 C mod 0 and there exists, according to Lemma 5.2, C" = C"(pf", D") e 
e <g such that C" dom C mod 0. As C = C'm, j f is a sub-partition of jf", j f 4= X", 
According to Remark 7.2, also C" = C"at, therefore no weak domination sequence 
modulo 0 from C" to C can exist. It means that 
C" Dom C mod 0 . 
It is possible to find, among all the configurations C" e <€, satisfying C" Dom . 
. C mod 0, at least one configuration C = C(3f, D) 6 # such that if C" = C"(,#"', 
D") e <€, C" Dom C mod 0, then X" is a sub-partition of X. At the same time 
C = Crat and there exist no Cx e ^ and n o c j c C n C , such that Cr 8 Cmod Cj. 
It means that not only 
C Dom C mod 0 
but also C p C holds. Hence, C £ tp*.*. 
Supposing the equality 
*.(C) = *.(C) 
holds for every player i e I, and C 4 2!, then C ̂  3, and there exists Cj e ^ such that 
Cx 8 C mod 0. According to Lemma 5.2, there exists C" e <€ such that C" dom C . 
. mod 0. According to Lemma 7.3, C" dom C mod 0 and the relation C <£ip** can 
be derived in the same way as in the foregoing case. 
In such a way the inclusion 
<Pr* c 2 u J ' 
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has been proved. According to the foregoing steps of this proof, to Lemma 6.1 and 
to Remark 7.4 the following chain of inclusions follows: 
a. u 2! => <p** ^ Q r => <pj => 33r => J ' u J 
which proves according to Theorem 1, the assertion of this Theorem. Q 
The following theorem deals with the prediction in another special type of coaliton-
games without identification. 
Theorem 3. Supposing every admissible coalition structure in a coalition-game 
without identification contains at most two coalitions, then every admissible configura-
tion is strongly predictionally stable if and only if it is predictionally balanced and 
this holds if and only if it is not strongly dominated modulo 0; i.e. 
33* = <pr = Q r . 
Proof . Lemma 6.1 and Remark 7.4 imply that 
£ r => ^3* =, <pr . 
Only the inclusion 
Q r c = 9 3 r 
remains to be proved. If C = C(jf, D) e <8, then either tf = {l} or j f = {iC, I-K}, 
0 + K + / . If ,yf = {/} then 
C e Q r o C 6 f J r « . C = C ra t, 
according to Lemmas 5.3 and 6.1. If j f = {K,I-K}, K c J, 0 4= K =j= / , If there 
exists C ' e f , c = C n C such that C Dom C mod c, then necessarily c = 0. Hence, 
we obtain again 
C e fir o C e yr . 
It means that 
<Pr = Q r => ^3 r =, $ r , 
which proves the assertion of the theorem. • 
8. Bargaining in Three-Players Games without Identification 
Three-players games represent the most simple case of the coalition-games (i.e. 
coalition-games without strategies choosing) to which the proposed prediction 
procedure can be applied. The notation introduced in Section 7 is preserved during 
whole this section. Moreover, the players will be denoted by the indices 1, 2, 3, i.e. 
/ = {1, 2, 3}, the particular coalition structures will be denoted by 
X 0 = {{1},{2},{3}}, *rt = { { . } , / - { . } } , « - 1 , 2 , 3 , * • , « { / } . 
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Instead of v{({i}), w({i}), v{({i,j}), w({i,j}), iel, jel, i 4= ;, we shall write simply 
»,(/), M'(/), vt(i,j), w(i,j), respectively. 
Remark 8.1. When a three-players game without an identification and with a free 
cooperation is considered, then Lemmas 5.1 and 6.3, Remark 7.1 and relations (2.3) 
and (7.1) imply the following assertions: 
(a) For any two-element coalition {i,j} c I, a side payments matrix D{iJ) can be 
found such that the agreement ({i,j}. D{i>J)) was rational. 
(b) If a side-payments matrix Dt e 3>Jy for which the agreement (/, Dj) is rational, 
exists then 
2-K I)= Z »(.,/). 
U,J)^i 
Besides the general theorems, introduced in the foregoing sections, even the 
following statements hold. 
Lemma 8.1. If T is a three-players coalition-game without identification, then 
D r c <p**. 
Proof. Let C € <8, and let C £ <p**. If C 4= Crat then there exists C e <$, C = Crat, 
such that 
C dom C mod 0 
and, according to Definition 2, or Remark 7.2, there exists no C" e ^ such that 
C dom C" mod 0 . 
Hence, 
C Dom C mod 0 
as well. If C = Cra„ C = C(jf, D), and C <£ ^p**, then is, in accordance with Lemma 
6.3, 3f * JTj and there exist C = C(tf', D') e <?, C = Crat, and c c C n C 
so that 
C Dom C mod c . 
If Jf + j f 0 then the only c, satisfying these conditions, is c = 0. If j f = j f 0 and 
c 4= 0, then there exists a weak domination sequence modulo c from C to C and, 
consequently, there exists C" = C"at, C" e <?, such that 
C" dom C mod c . 
The equation C" = Crat implies, according to Remark 5.4, the relation 
C" dom C mod 0 . 
37 
On the other hand, there is no weak domination sequence modulo 0 from C" to C, 
for C" = C"at and ,/f = X0. Hence, 
C" Dom C mod 0 
and the proof is finished. • 
Theorem 4. When a three-players coalition-game E without identification is con-
sidered, then every admissible configuration is weakly predictionally stable if and 
only if it is predictionally balanced, and this holds if and only if it is not strongly 
dominated modulo 0. The bargaining prediction characteristic in F satisfies, in such 
a case, the identities 
$** = $? = %• = *--. 
Proof . At first, the identity <$* = <pr = & r will be proved. If JT0 $ K, then this 
identity holds, according to Theorem 3. If Jf 0 e K, if there exists J f 4= Jf0, X e K , 
and K e X such that 
w(K)>^w(i), 
ieK 
then there exists C = C(jf, 3) e <$ such that C = Crat and C Dom C0 mod 0, where 
C0 = C0(jf0, Q)e
(€, 0 is the zero side-payments matrix. It implies that 
C 0 ^ Q r 3 ^ * ^ ^ S r . 
Suppose that C + C0, C e <£. If C + Crat, then there exists C e <€ such that 
C Dom C mod 0, and 
C £ D r = 3 <p* => <pr. 
If C = Crat then the relation C0 8 C mod 0 cannot hold. If for some C e<g, c c C, 
the relation C 5 C mod c holds, then c = 0, hence 
C 6 $ r < s > C e Q r 
and the identity holds. If 
KK) = y>(o 
for all coalitions K e \\ K\\, then 
<Pr = £ r = <P* = {C : C e <*, *((C) = Hi)} = ^rat • 
Now, the identity '$** = £2r remains to be proved. Lemma 8 1 implies that 
^3** ZJ £} r . Supposing r is a game with a strictly bounded cooperation, then the 
desired identity follows immediately from Theorem 2. If it is not the case, then the 
class K contains at least two from the three coalition structures jf,-, i = 1, 2, 3. 
Let us suppose that <$** - Q r # 0, and try to describe the configurations which' 
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may belong to the class "$** - £>r. No configuration of the type C = C(jfr, D) 
may belong to this class. If C £ £} r , then necessary C 4= Crat and, according to 
Lemma 6.3, C ̂  <p**. Analogously, no configuration C = C(jf 0, 0) belongs to the 
class '$?** — S r . As C is the only possible configuration including the coalition 
structure Jf 0, C e ^3** -=- C e *ip* and, because of Sfi* = O r , C cannot belong to 
<p** - O r . 
Now, the configurations of the type C = C(jT;, D) e "if, i = 1, 2, 3, remain. 
Let us consider, step by step, such particular cases of games, in which the class K 
contains at least two from the coalition structures Jf h i = 1, 2, 3. We limit ourselves 
to introducting the principal steps of the procedure, as they are sufficient in order 
to explain the method of this proof and because of the length of the whole detailed 
proof. 
At first, the case, in which K contains exactly two from the coalition structures 
Jf h i el, is considered; let us denote these two structures by Jfj, Jfk. By <€Jk the 
class 
<g.k = {C:C= C(tfh D)e<#,i = ;, k} 
is denoted. It.follows, from the foregoing, that: 
<P** - Q r = ( $ : * n <€}k) - (Q r n <gJk) . 
If <£*.* n <€Jk = 0, then <p** - £ r = 0. 
If %* n <gJk 4= 0, and if 
then 
w(i> i) ~ HO > H'> k) ~~ H*0 ' i s í , j 4= i 4= fc , 
$*•* n ^ = Q r n <̂ ,fe = {C : C = C(jfkJ D) , 
C e <€Jk, Xj(C) = w(j), Xi(C) = w(i, k) - w(k)} ; 
w(i,j) - w(j) = w(i, k) — w(k), iel, j 4= i 4= k , 
then 
$*•* n ^ = Q r n <€jk = {C : C e <€Jk, Xj(C) = ,,(/), Xk(C) = 
= w(k),Xi(C) = w(i,j)-w(j)}. 
Hence, in every case ty** - £} r = 0. 
Finally we shall consider the case the class K contains all the coalition structures 
Jfl> Jf 2, -#V Let us denote 
^ 1 2 3 = ( c : C = C(jf,, D) e tf, j = 1, 2, 3} . 
If <p** n <€X2Z = 0, the identity S$** - £>r = 0 holds like in the foregoing case. 
If ^8r r\<€123 4= 0 ; then the following possibilities occur: 
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(a) There exists a coalition {;', k} e \\K\\ satisfying: 
(8.1) w(j, k) > w(i, j) + w(i, k) - 2w(i), lei, j + i * k , 
then s $ r * n ^ 1 2 3 = £ r n <tw = {C : C = C(jft, D) e <€, Xj(C) = w(i,j) -
- w(i), xk(C) Z w(i, k) - HO} > 
(8.2) w(j, k) = w(i,j) + w(i, k) ~ 2w(i), iel, j 4= i + k , 
and then s^ r* n Vli3 = £>r n ^ 1 2 3 = {C : C e <$123, x{C) = w(i), Xj(C) = 
= w(i,j) - w(i), xk(C) = w(i, k) - w(i)}. 
(b) Supposing neither (8.1) nor (8.2) holds for any two-element coalition from 
IK| and if there exists a coalition {i,j} e |fC|| satisfying 
(8.3) w(i, k) - w(k) > w(i,j) - w(j), w(j, k) - w(k) > w(i,j) - w(i), 
then we can proceed at the same way as if Xk $ K, and in the same way as 
in the foregoing part of the proof we can derive that 
<P** n <^123 = Q r n ^ 1 2 3 . 
(c) Supposing no of the foregoing possibilities (a) and (b) occurs, then: 
$ • * n ^ 1 2 3 = Q r n <f123 = {C:Ce <€ 123, Xi(C) = w(i), i = 1. 2, 3} . 
It means that even in this case SP** - Q r = 0. Hence, this identity holds in every 
case. So, we have proved the identities 
«P* = <pf = Q r and *p** = Q r , 
which prove the assertion of Theorem. • 
Remark 8.2. The foregoing results enable us to determine, if necessary, the actual 
form of the bargaining prediction characteristic for particular types of the three-
players game without identification. In every case 
<P** n ^ r a t = <$** = <p* = ^ r = Q r 
and the class & r is of the following form: 
(a) If r is a game with fixed cooperation, then Q r =
 (6. 
(P) If K = {X 0 , df,}, i = 1, 2, 3, if j e l - {i}, kel - {«}, y * fc, then Q r = 
= Qp , where 
(PI) Qp = {C = C(jf(, D) : */C) ^ HA **(
C) = *<fc)}> if H j k) > Mi) + Mk>. 
(p2) % = {C : C e * , *m(C) = H<m), m = 1,2,3}, if w(j, k) = w(j) + w(k). 
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(Y) If K = {jf0, j f 7 } , then Q r = QY, where 
(Yl) Q Y = {C = C(jTr, D) : x;(C) > H-(/), i e / } , if M-(/) > Y>( / ) ; 
(Y2) Q r = {C : C e » , x;(C) = H>(/), i e l } , if H»(/) = £ "(')• 
1 6 / 
(5) If K = {Xh J f , } , / = 1, 2, 3, if j el - {/}, fee/ - {/},; + fc, then Q r = Q5, 
where 
(51) Qd = {C = C(jf„ D) : x;(C) ^ >,(/), x,(C) + xk(C) > H-(J, fc)} , i f „,(/) > 
> w(i) + w(j, k); 
(52) Q5 = {C : C e <g, x{C) = w(i)},if w(l) = H-(/) + M>(;, fc). 
(e) If K = {jf 0, jf... j f 7 } , i = 1, 2, 3, j e J - {/}, fc e / - {/}, ; + fc, then Q r = 
= QE, where 
(el) Qe = {C = C(JTI; D) : xm(C) ^ w>(m), m = 1, 2, 3, x /C) + Xk(C) ^ 
^ H>(;, fc)}, if w(l) > w(j, fc) + w(i); 
(82) QE = Q p u {C = C(jf„ D ) : C e Q , n Q5}, if w(l) = w(j, fc) + *-(/). 
(C) If K = {jf., Jfj), i el J el, i + ;, if fc el - {/,;'}, then Q r = Q,, where 
g l ) Q, = {C = C(jf;, D) : x,(C) > „-(/, fc) - H-(/), x /C) >: ,,(/), X ;(C) = H-(/)}, 
if w(j,k) — w(j) > w(i, fc) — w(i); 
(^2) Q, = {C = C(jfm, D) : m = ij, x;(C) = H>(/), X,<C) = n-Q), xk(C) = 
= H-(i, fc) — H>(/)}, if M-(/, fc) — w(j) = w(i, fc) — w(i). 
(n) If K = {jf 0, Jf;, J f j], i el J el, i +j,kel - {i , ;}, then Q r = Q„, where 
(n.1) Q^ = Q ;, if *</, fc) + w(i, fc) > w(i) + w(j) + 2w(k); 
(n.2) Q„ = Qc u {C(jf 0, 0)} = {C = C(jf, D) : j f e K, xm(C) = n-(m), m = 1. 2, 3}, 
if H>(J, fc) + w(i, fc) = w(i) + w(j) + 2w(k). 
(K) If K = {jf,., jfy, J f , } , ieljelj + ;', fc el - {/,;} then Q r = QK, where 
(Kl) Q K = {C = C ( J T „ D) : x;(C) ^ H-(/), X / C ) 2: H-(/), X,(C) + x.(C) 2: H-(/, fc), 
x /C) + Xj(C) > M-(;', fc)} u {C = C(jf, D) : j f e K, j f * J f „ C e Q,, 
£ xm(C) = w(l)}, if 2w(7) >: w(i, fc) + w(j, fc) + w(i) + w(j); 
m = l 
(K2) Q K = Q?, if 2w(l) < w(i, fc) + w(j, k) + w(i) + w(j). 
(X) If K = {jf 0, Jf;, Jfj, Jfj}, i el J el, i + j , k el - {/,;}, then Q r = QA, 
where 
(X\) Qx = {C = C(JT 7 , D) : x„,(C) ^ w(m), m = 1, 2, 3, x;(C) + x /C) >: w(i, fc), 
x/C) + xk(C) > w-(./, k)} u {C -> C(jr, D) : Jf e K, jf + Jf „ C' e Qn, 
3 
£ Xm(C) = H-(/)}, if 2w(l) >: w(i, fc) + W(j, fc) + H-(i) + W(j); 
m = l 
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(X2) Qx = Q,, if 2w(l) < w(i, k) + w(j, k) + w(i) + w(j). 
(n) If K = {X0, Xlt X2, Jf3} (the case K = { j r t , jf2l j f 3} is eliminated by 
condition (2.1)), then Q r = QM, where 
^ 1 ) if there exist coalition {/, j} a /, and kel — {/, j} such that w(i, j) > w(i, k) + 
+ w(j, k) - 2w(k), then QM = {C = C(yfk, D) : x(C) ^ w(i, k) - w(k), 
Xj(C)^w(j,k)-w(k)}; 
(^2) if there exist {/,}} <=• I and fe e / — {i, j} such that w(i, j) = w(i, k) + w(j, k) -
- 2w(k), then &„ = {C : C e «", x{C) = H>(/, fc) - w(k), Xj(C) = M>(/\ fc) -
-w(k),xk(C) = w(k)}; 
(\i3) if there exist {/, j} c: / and kel — {/, j} such that w(i, fc) - w(fc) > w(i,j) — 
- w(y), w(j, k) - w(k) > w(i,j) - w(i), then £^ = £>,,; 
^ 4 ) if none of the conditions, contained in (jil), (u2) and ^3) , holds for any two-
elements coalition {/,j} <=/, and if there exists some coalition {/,;'} c J 
such that w(i, j ) > w>(/) + n>(7'), then Qp = {C = C(.yfm, D) : m = 1, 2, 3„ 
xr(C) ^ w(r), r = 1,2, 3}; 
(fi5) if there is no coalition {i,j} <= I satisfying some of the conditions (JAI), (ji-2), 
(n3), (n4), then S„ = {C : C e <€, Xi(C) = w(i), i = 1, 2, 3}. 
(v) If K = {jf0, jTi , Jf2, Jf3, tfj} (the possibility K = {jf,, jf2, Jf3, Jf ,} is 
eliminated by (2.1)), then Q r = Qv, where 
(vl) Qv = {C = C(X r , D) : x,(C) §; H</), X ; (C) + x /C) ^ H>(/,/), jor a// i el, 
jel, i 4= j ) u {C : Ce &„, anrf J] X;(C) = w(J)}, if 2«>(l) ^ M<1 , 2) + 
+ w(l, 3) + w(2, 3); f6/ 
(v2) Qv = £.„, if 2w(7) < w(l, 2) + w(l, 3) + w(2, 3). 
Remark 8.3. The three-players games with a general identification may differ 
from the investigated type of games without an identification only when the identifica-
tion partitions of the one-element coalitions are considered; these partitions cannot 
contain more than two identification sets. It means that the considerations, used 
in this section, may be modified for the general three-players games. Even if we 
cannot insist in the general results of Section 7 in such a case, the obtained results 
will probably not differ too much from those included in Remark 8.2. Only the 
number of all possible cases which we shall have to consider will increase rather 
substantially, as the necessity will occur to distinguish the particular types of games 
not only with respect to the form of the class K and functions e( (resp. w), but even 
with respect to the identification partitions of the one-element coalitions. An analysis 
of all such cases would request, of course, for too great space, which is also the 
principal reason for the limiting our investigation to the games without identification. 
Without any further investigation we can easily verify, that the three-players coalition-
games without strategies choosing, which were described in Remark 8.2 in paragraphs 
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(a), (y), (5), (£) and (K) are always games without an identification. The previous 
consideration concerns, consequently, to the games described in paragraphs (P), (s), 
(n), (A,), (u) and (v) only. 
PART IV. STRATEGIES IN BARGAINING. 
The bargaining model suggested in the second part of this paper was defined and investigated 
for games without strategies choosing only. It is shown in the following sections that this bar-
gaining model may be used also for general games defined in Section 2. The results, obtained 
above, remain to be true even after such modification. 
Moreover, the possibility of strategies choosing enables us to study even the games with fixed 
cooperation in which the activity of players is realized in the strategies only. 
In this part we return to the general model of a coalition-game in such a form as 
introduced in Section 2. Hence, we shall suppose that the players have a possibility 
to choose not only the coalitions to which they would like to belong, but that every 
coalition has to its disposal a finite set of pure strategies among which it may choose 
the one considered for the best from its own point of view. At the same time, accord-
ing to (2.2), the set of pure strategies of a given coalition need not be only the union 
of the strategies sets of its members, but it may contain even some qualitatively 
new possibilities of behaviour, different from the possibilities of the particular players. 
The possibility of choosing among the strategies necessarily influences the bar-
gaining process and the bargaining result. From point of view of the proposed 
prediction method, the choosing of strategies influences, at the first time, the ratio-
nality of the agreements, depending, in this case, even on the optimality of the chosen 
coalition strategy. 
As the prediction method, proposed in Section 5 and 6 may be modified even for 
the general coalition-games with a finite identification without considerable troubles, 
we limit ourselves, in the following, only to those steps of the proposed procedure, 
which bring some qualitatively new points of view or which differ from the results 
mentioned above. It is why the two following sections are written only on an informa-
tive and survey level, the modified forms of definitions and assertions are written 
in all the details only in case they differ, from those mentioned in previous parts 
not only by the used notations. 
The last sections give then an illustration, how the choosing of strategies influences 
the process of bargaining when an extreme case of the strategic coalition-games is 
considered, namely the case of the strategic coaliton-games with a fixed cooperation 
(i.e. games, in which the bargaining process is limited only to a searching for appro-
priate strategies and to a choosing of the side-payments). 
In all following part the notations introduced in sections 2 and 3 are used. 
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9. Extended Bargainig Model 
We limit ourselves in this section only to proclaiming of the existing analogies, 
and to mentioning only those steps which differ when the both types of games — the 
coalition-games with a finite identification and the coalition-games with a finite 
identification and without strategies choosing — are considered. 
The definitions of the auxiliary relations — the weak and strong domination 
relations and the definition of rationality — are the same as those introduced in the 
first part of this work (c.f. Definitions 1 — 5). They differ only as for as the formal 
shape of configurations is considered, because it is necessary to consider and write 
configurations as triples, mentioning explicitely the corresponding strategies. For 
example, the rationality definition will have the following form: 
Definition l.A. Let C = C(X, s, D) e <?. We shall say that the agreement (K, sK, 
DK) e C is rational in C, if there exists no C e <€ satisfying C 5 C mod c(C; Jt) — 
— {K}). The symbol Crat will denote the set of all the agreements rational in C. 
Also the assertions using these definitions hold mostly in analogous forms. The 
only exception is represented by Remark 5.3, which does not hold, as in case the 
games with a possibility of choosing strategies are considered, the rationality of 
agreements depends also on the advantage of the chosen coalition strategy. For the 
same reason, Lemma 5.1 does not hold; it must be modified for the general coalition-
games in the following way: 
Lemma 9.1. Let (Jf, s) e Ks, (K, sK) e (jf, s). Let us denote 
KS(K) = {(if, s') : (if, s') e Ks, (<?, s') n (jf, s) => (jf, s) - {(K, sK)}} 
and 
K(K) = {&:<£ eK, .S? n j f => Jf - {K}} . 
Let there exists a matrix D = (DL)Le^~ e Bx and a configuration C = C(jf, s, D) e <£ 
such that (K, SK, DK) e Crat then for all coalition structures i ? e K(K) the inequality 
£ f . ( X , « ) £ Z m a x { Z » i ( ^ s ' ) : ( i f , s ' ) 6 K s ( X ) } 
iel L^K.LeSC ieL 
holds. 
The p roo f of Lemma 9.1 is analogous to that one for Lemma 5.1, supposing 
we included into our considerations beside the possibility of a partition of a coalition 
K even the possibility of choosing their common strategy. 
Neither the Corollary of Lemma 5.1 holds, if we consider the games with a possi-
bility of strategies choosing; it is necessary to subtitute the following one for it. 
Corollary. If (cf, s) e Ks, (K, sK) e (X, s), s = (sL)LeX then the foregoing Lemma 
9.1 implies: 
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(a) if K = {i}, i e I, then the agreement (K, sK, 0) is rational in C(jf, s, D), where 
D = (DL)LsX- e <2sx, DK is the zero matrix, iff 
»,(jf, s) = max {t),.(jf, s'): s' = (s^),^ e S*, s'L = s t /or Le Jt~, L + K} 
(b) if K = {i, j } , iel,jel,i + ;*, then there exists a matrix D = (DL)LEX e <#,*• 
and a configuration C = C(jf, s, D) e *? such that (K, sK, DK) e Crat iff 
i);(jf, s) + - / j r , s) = max {e,(X, s') + c/jf, s') : s' = 
= K W e S„ s'L = 5L /or L+K,Le X} , 
Vt(X, s) + Vj(X, s) £ max {v,(2, s') : $' 6 S<?(K)} + 
+ max { D / J ? , »') : s' e S^K)} , 
where &eK,&nJT = XT - {K}, {i} e 2, {}} e i f and 
S^(K) = {(if, •') : s' = (s'L)LE#, S'L = sL /or Le.Sf, L n K = 0} . 
The other lemmas and remarks, given in Section 5, are true even for the case 
of coalition-games with the possibility of strategies choosing. 
Also the notions of strong predictional stability and predictional balance, introdu-
ced in Section 6 (Definitions 6 and 8), will not change when the games with a strate-
gies choosing are considered. 
It is necessary to stop for a while when the definition of the weak predictional avoiding 
relation and the definition of the weak predictional stability, corresponding to the 
former one, are considered. Principally, Definition 7 may be generalized in two ways: 
Definition 7A. Supposing C = C(yf, s, D) e <€, C = C(JT', s', D') e <€, then the 
relation C p C holds, if 
(a) there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C, 
(b) there exist no configurations C = C\tf, s, Dt) e <€, C t t = C\jf', s', D") e <$ 
satisfying the four following conditions: 
(bl) there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C tf, 
(b2) there exists a strong domination sequence from Cft to C, 
(b3) (L, sL, DL) e Crat o (L, sL, Z>[) e C*,,, 
(b4) (J, s'j, D'j) e Cr'at o (J, s'j, DV) e C»t . 
If there exists, for a configuration C e <€, no C e <€ such that C p C, we say that C 
is weakly predictionally stable. The class of all weakly predictionally stable configura-
tions in a given game T will be denoted by ^8** (or 'tp**^)) , 
Definition 7B. Supposing C = C(jf, s, D) e <€, C = C(Jf', $', D') e <€, then the 
relation C p C holds, if 
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(a) there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C, 
(b) there exist no configurations C = C(jf, s\ Dt) e V, Cft = Cft(.^", s t f, Dt1) e 
e <#, satisfying the four following conditions: 
(bl) there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C t t, 
(b2) there exists a strong domination sequence from C t t to C , 
(b3) (L, sL, DL) e Crat o (L, 4 , Z>tt 6 C?Bt, 
(b4) (J, s'j, D'j) e Cr'at ^ (J, stt, /)tt) e C n . 
If there exists, for a configuration C e f, no C e <<f? such that C p C, we say that C 
is weakly predictionally stable. The class of all weakly predictionally stable configura-
tions will be denoted by $** (or $ r*(B)). 
Both the definitions may be used, in order to introduce the notion of weak pre-
dictional stability. If we denote the classes of the weakly predictionally stable con-
figurations by ty*r*(A) and %>*r*(B), then the relation *$*r*(B) n <^rat # 0 can be 
derived analogically as in the proof of Theorem 1 and relation ^P*-*(B) => ^**(A) 
can be also easily checked. 
In the following we limit ourselves to the first modification of Definition 7 and set 
$** = %*r*(A) . 
It means that we have decided to impose more exacting requirements to the weakly 
predictionally stable configurations. Such an election is logical, as this part of this 
paper deals not only with the investigation of the. process of the coalitions forming, 
but even with the investigation of the process of choosing their strategies. Definition 
7B abstracts from the problem of strategies choosing as well as from the problem 
of side payments choosing, and deals with the chosen strategies only under the 
condition they do not affect the rationality of the agreements. 
For the class $** = ^3**(A) the following analogy of Theorem 1 holds. 
Theorem 1A. Supposing L is a coalition-game with a finite identification then there 
exists at least one weakly predictionally stable configuration having rational charac-
ter, i.e. 
$ r * n <?rat * 0 . 
Proof . It is necessary to realize, firstly, that •!?„. + 0. If j f e K is such a configura-
tion that for n o / e K / i s a subpartition of JT, if we choose s = (sK)Ke# e S# 
in such a way that for every K e Jf the identification set RK e 3%K existed, satisfying 
£ v(K, sK, RK) > £ ».(K, - i . RK) 
ieK ieK 
for all s'KeSK (it is possible, according to Remark 3.1), then C(JT,S, D)e<<??rat for 
every matrix D e B^. 
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We construct, for every coalition K e \\K\\ and for every identification set RK e 0lK, 
the set 
SK(RK) ={sK:sKeSK, £ vt(K, sK, RK) ^ £ v(K, s'K, RK) for all s'K e SK} . 
ieK isK 
Remark 3.1 implies that SK(RK) =f= 0. 
Let us denote by KK the class 
KK = {X :XeK,KeX} . 
Then there exists a finite set WK of indices and a partition of the set SK into subsets 
s^OA), "A e "lV s u c n that for every pair sK, s'K of strategies, belonging to the same set 
SK(IIJ), the following holds: 
If _? e KK, (if, s) e Ks, (<£, s') e K S ) S = ( - J ^ , s' = (s'L)L^, s'L = sL 
for Le i? , L =)= -K, then for all coalitions Le <£ the strategic structures (<£,%')belong 
to the same identification ser RL e ML. This means that the pay-offs t>; of players 
iel — K will not change, if the coalition K changes its strategy inside the set SK(ij/). 
If 
Ke\\K\\, sKeSK- U SK(RK), 
RKS®K 
then for no matrix DK e <2)K and for no configuartion C e <€ is (K, sK, DK) e Crat. 
Hence, if (K, sK, DK) e C, then C e <fo - <€nt. 
The class Ks may be divided into a finite number of disjoint subsets 
n0,nun2, •••,^, 
where 
T ^ ( K ) ( £ n(mK))( £ <^) ) , 
K s | | K | | KG II K|| 
so that 
'h = {(•#", s) : (tf, s) e K s , s = (sjie^r > a«<l there exists K e X swc/i f/iaf 
% ^ x - U s xW)}, 
RK^K 
and the sets if,, 1 | ( g t, satisfy: 
If (Jf, s) e ̂ t, (X', s') e ̂ t, then X = X', s = (sK)KeX, s' = (SK)KeX and for all 
K e # the strategies sK and s'K belong to the same set 
SK(RK) n SK(ij,), RKeMK, i//eVK. 
We know, from the foregoing, that if (X, s) e ;l0, then for every matrix D e<3Jx 
the configuration C(X, s,D)e<€- <€nt. If(X, s) and (X, s') belong to the same set 
7?„ 1 g t _ T, then for all coalitions K e JT 
X t,;(K, ,K, RK) = X •>.(*, sk, RK) , 
ieK ieK 
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where (jf, s) e RK, (X, s') eRKe 3/1K. Hence, there exists, for every matrix D e 3>x, 
such a D' e@x that for C = C(jf, s, S>) e <*?, C = C(jf, s', D') e <¥ the relation 
x{C) = x f(C) holds for every iel. It follows that (K, sK, DK)eCTat iff (K,s'K, 
D'K)eCn, 
The following procedure is analogous to the procedure, by which Theorem 1 
was proved. We choose C" e <^rat and a strong domination sequence 
K(r)W „, {c^u,...-.-! 
from C{1) = C to a configuration C(n) e <<f such that for r = 2, 3, ..., n - 1 either 
C ( r + 1 ) p C ( r \ 
holds (if C(r) G <?rat), or 
C ( r + 1 ) D o m C r ) m o d c ( r ) and C ^ p C " 1 ' 
hold (if C(r) e <€ - <if?rat). After a finite number of steps such a C
(n) e r#rat may be 
constructed that C(n) = C(n)(jf, s, D) and there exist an index w,l < w < n and a con-
figuration C(w) = C(w)(jf, s(w), D(w)) such that (jf, s) and (jf, s(w)) belong to the 
same set r\t, 1 <, t <, T; to every configuration C = C(jf ' , s', D') for which there 
exists a strong domination sequence from C(n) to C such an index v, w < v < n 
and such a configuration C(o) = C(v)(X", s(v\ D{u)) may be found that (jf', s(p)) 
and (jf', s') belong to the same set *;„ if 1 ^ f g T, or they both belong to the set 
Vo n {(Jf', s") 
for some vector of indices 
( < A K W - e X «PX , 
KsX' 
if (.Jf', s') e >/0. It means that noC'e<if exists such that C p C
(n), hence C"' e <p**. D 
The other assertions, introduced in section 6, hold, when the coalition-games 
with a finite identification are considered, in the form analogous to that in the 
case of the games without strategies choosing. 
10. Strategies in Games without Identification 
The games without identification are the limit case of the games with a finite 
identification and everything mentioned in the foregoing section holds even in this 
case. 
Some special properties of the games without identification imply that the process 
of bargaining is influenced by strategies, in such a case, less then in the case of more 
general games with a finite identification. 
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We denote, similarly as in relation (7.1), 
(10.1) w(K) = max { £ v{K, sK, RK) : sK e SK} = max { £ v{,yf, s) : s e S^} , 
ieK ieK 
where K e Jf e K, RKe @K. 
It can be easily checked that all the assertions of sections 7 and 8 hold in analogous 
form even in the case of the general coalition-games without identification. For every 
admissible coalition Ke |K[| is S%K = {RK} and there exists a non-empty set SK c SK 
of strategies, 
(10.2) SK = {sK : sK e SK, £ v{K, sK, RK) = w(K)} . 
ieK 
If sKe SK - SK then there exists neither a matrix DK e 3)K, nor a configuration 
C e <# such that (K, sK, DK) e Crat. On the other hand, if sK e SK, s'K e SK, then the 
relation 
£ v{K, sK, RK) = £ v{K, s'K, RK) = H<K) 
ieK ieK 
holds as well as the assertion of Remark 3.4. 
At the same time, an analogy of Remark 7.1 is satisfied when the rationality of 
agreements considered; two agreements (K, sK, DK) and (K, s'K, D'K) such that 
SK e SK, s'K e SK, DK = (dl7)feK J s K , D'K = (dy).6K JeK , 
and 
v{K, sK, RK) + £ du = v{K, s'K, RK) + £ d'u 
ieK jeK 
for all i e I, have the property that both of them are rational or none of them is 
rational. 
It follows from the foregoing, that when a coalition-game without identification 
is considered, the strategies sK of the coalitions, satisfying sKe SK — SK, do not 
occur in the configurations, belonging to the bargaining prediction characteristic. 
On the other hand, the strategies of the coalitions, belonging to the same set SK 
are equivalent from the point of view of their influence to the bargaining process 
and from the point of view of their occurrence in the result. 
The foregoing consideration can be formulated in the following theorem. 
Theorem 5. Let (jf, s) e Ks, (jf, s') e Ks be two admissible strategic structures 
differing only in the vector of strategies. Let for all coalitions K e JT the relation 
£ t,(X, s) = £ tlX, s') 
ieK ieK 
holds, Then the following holds: 
If there exists a coalition K e X satisfying 
X v{X, s) < w(K), 
ieK 
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then for any side payments matrices D, D' e 3>x the configutations C = C(jf, s, D), 
C = C'(Jf, s', D') neither are weakly predictionally stable nor have rational character. 
On the other hand, if the equality 
X vt(jf, s) = w(K) 
ieK 
holds for all coalitions K e X" then there exists, for every matrix D e 1?^- and every 
configuration C = C(jf, s, D)e <£, a matrix D' e ^ and a configuration C = 
= C'(jf, s, D') e ^ such that 
x{C) = x,.(C) 
for all i e I, and 
C e ^ r a t < * C ' e # r a t , C € ^ * * * > C ' e ^ * , 
C e ^ o C e f * , C e tyr oC'e^r, 
CeQr o C e f i f , 
where 
Q r = {C : C e ^ and there exists no C e <€ such that C Dom C mod 0}. 
Proof . Definition 1 and Lemma 3.1 imply that if sKeSK - SK, then the agreement 
(K, sK, DK) is not rational for any matrix DK e 3>K. According to the fact that Re-
marks 11 and 7.3 hold even in the case of the general coalition-games, the first 
assertion of Theorem 3 holds as well. The second assertion follows from Remark 3.4 
and from the definitions. • 
Theorem 5 means that every coalition-game V without identification may be con-
sidered, from the point of view of the proposed prediction method, as if it was 
a coalition game T without choosing strategies, in which every coalition K has 
prescribed a fixed strategy from the set SK, The procedures and results of sections 7 
and 9 may be applied to the game T and the classes of configurations #ratfT), tyr*, 
^8*, ^3 r and & r may be obtained. The analogous sets for the game F follow from 
them according to the schema: 
3 r = 3 r y [C : C = C(tf, s', D') e <€, and there exists C = C(X, s, D) e 3 r 
such that Xi(C) = x,(C) for all iel} , 
where we substitute for 3T and 3r the pairs (#„ , ( / ) , #„ , ( / ) ) , ($*•*, "£**)> (*r» 
<Pr), (S\$T, <pr) and (ST, Qf) step by step. 
In the case of the general three-players games Remark 8.3 does not hold. According 
to the possibility of choosing strategies the complexity of the identification partitions 
of the one-element and two-element coalitions can considerably increase and the 
bargaining prediction becomes, in such a case, incomparably more complicated 
than for the three-players games without identification. 
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11. Games with a Fixed Cooperation 
As for as we did not consider the possibility of strategies choosing, the bargaining 
prediction in the games with a fixed cooperation had no actual raison. Such a case 
was a degenerated one, when the players were not given any possibility of an active 
intervention into the game, and all the admissible configurations were at the same 
measure possible. 
The situation rather changes in case we consider a possibility of choosing strate-
gies. Then the game with a fixed cooperation represents a model of conflict situation 
in which the influence of the process of coalition forming is avoided and the bargain-
ing prediction is concentrated to the prediction of the chosen strategies. 
As it will be shown later, even in this case the weak and strong predictional stability, 
as well as the predictional balance of the configurations, does not depend on the 
value of side payments, what follows from the fact that the members of a coalition 
are not given a possibility to force a change of the side payments through threats. 
In this way, from the point of view of strategies choosing, every coalition may be 
considered for a particular player, only except the fact that, when applying our 
proposed prediction method, we must respect the information about the value of the 
guaranteed profit particulary for every single member of coalition. 
The necessity to respect, when particular steps of the prediction applied, every 
particular player will not influence, however, the prediction result. 
As a game with a fixed cooperation is considered, where K = {X}, we shall 
simplify the used notation in such a way that instead of (X, s), C(X, s, D) and 
vt(X, s) we shall write abbreviately s, C(s, D), ».(s).. In whole the following section 
we consider a given coalition-game 
r = (i,K,{sK}Ke]m, {®K}KeW[, {t.}feJ), 
where K = {X}. 
Firstly, we show that the bargaining result is independent on the level of the side 
payments. As the results are quite objective and their proofs are mostly descriptive 
ones (but, when all the steps written in all details, rather lenghty) we limit ourselves, 
for the sake of lucidity, to mentioning of the substantial steps of the particular 
proofs. 
Remark 11.1. Supposing C = C(s, D)e<€, KeX, (X, s) e RK, RK e @K, then 
(K, sK, DK) s Crat iff 
£ v,{s) = max { X f.(s') : « ' e ^ (•#", *') e RK} . 
ieK ieK 
Lemma 11.1. Supposing C(1) = C^\s, D ( 1 ) ) e ^ , C(2) = 02\s, D(2)) e <g, k <=X, 
k =|= X, then the following holds: 
51 
There exist c(1) = c(1)(C(1); k) and C = C(s', D') e # satisfying at least one 
among the relations 
(la) C dom C(1) mod c ( 1 ) , or 
(2a) C(1) dom C mod c ( 1 ) , or 
(3a) C D o m C ( 1 ) m o d c ( 1 ) , or 
(4a) C(1) Dom C mod c ( 1 ) , 
if and only if there exist c(2) = c(2)(C(2); k) and C" = C"(s', D")e^, satisfying the 
corresponding relation among the following ones 
(lb) C" dom C(2) mod c ( 2 ) , or 
(2b) C(2) dom C" mod c ( 2 ) , . or 
(3b) C" Dom C 2 ) mod c ( 2 ) , or 
(4b) C(2) Dom C" mod c ( 2 ) , respectively. 
The side payments matrices D' e 3ix, D" e 3>x can be chosen in such a way that the 
equality 
x{C) - Xi(C") = Xi(C") - * f(C
2 )) 
holds for all i e / . 
Proof . If 
C(1) = Cl\s, D(1)) , C(2) =- C(2)(s, D(2)) , C = C(s', D') , 
D ( 1 ) = ( < l ( 1 % ^ r , D (2) = (d ( 2 ) ) t e z j 6 , , D' = (d ' w ) W J r f * 
we construct 
D" e S ^ , C" = C"(i', D") e * 
in such a way that 
(11.1) D" = (d'lj)ieIJeI, dlj = «V+ d
(2) - d.}', i e L j e / , 
then 
(11.2) x;(C") - *;(C
(2>) = *,.(C) - x;(C
(1)) 
and, according to Definition 2 and Remark 11.1 the relation (la) holds.iff (lb) holds, 
(2a) holds iff (2b) holds. Supposing there exist weak domination sequences modulo c(1) 
from C(1) to C or from C to C(1), even the corresponding weak domination sequences 
modulo c(2) from C(2) to C" or from C" to C 2 ) can be constructed in such a way that 
we construct the corresponding side payments matrices sequences, satisfying equali-
ties of the type ( l l . l ) . Between the configurations from the both sequences, then 
some relations, analogous to (11.2), hold. This implies that the relations (3a) and 
(4a) hold iff (3b) and (4b) hold, respectively. Q 
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Lemma 11.2. If C = C(s, D) e % C = C(s, D') e V, c = c(C; k), c c C n C, if 
there exists a weak domination sequence modulo c from C to C, then there exists 
also a weak domination sequence modulo c from C to C. 
Proof. Let us denote by {C ( r >} r = l i „ a weak domination sequence modulo c 
from C to C, 
Cr> = Crl(S<
r>, D<r>) e % , D<r) = (_)_))__, - ( $ > ) W J _ , r = 1, ..., M , 
(11.3) C(1) = C, C"> = C , c = c(C;/r), 
(11.4) C r > d o m C r - l l m o d c , r = 2, . . . , « . 
Now, we construct a new sequence (j C(r)}r_li...i„, where 
> C r ) = »Cr)(s<r>, ' D(r>), > D<r> = ( ^ r W = W W i , r = I, ..., M , 
so that 
(11.5) ' _>_' = D{jr) for Jek, r = l , . . . ,M, 
(11.6) iD*1* = D(u) = D ' , 
(11.7) i_</}> = (.(K))"1 . ( x ^ C ^ 1 ) ) - f,(s<r)) - .v-X'C^") + ,.(S<
r>)) 
for i e __, jeK, KeX - /c, r = 2, 3, ..., u - 1. 
It means that ' C r ) _om 1 C ( r " 1 ) mod c for r = 2, ..., M - 1. 
(11.8) If K 6 j f - k, and if the agreement (K, ____ /><_>) e C"> is not active (c.f. 
Definition 2) in the relation C"> dom C ( B - 1>modc, then we choose 
l*? = fl") = DK. 
(11.9) If the agreement (K, .__>, D^) e C(u) is active in the relation 
C(u)dom C ( u ' 1 ) mod c, then we construct the matrix '_)£!> in the following 
way: 
For every player ieK we define numbers 
a(1> = j . i (
1 C " " 1 ) ) - f i ( s
( " ) ) , 
.(1> = m a x { 0 , ^ ( C ( 1 ) ) - . r , ( ' C " " 1 ) ) } , 
B_>./7. ! ) , 
r , ( l ) _ _ j K __ 
j e K 
- 1 < 5 _ . _ 0 , 
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where 
is a real number, 
and BK
l) = 0 iff x,(C(1)) > x^C'""1 ') for all ieK. Then we set 
M? = (n(K))~l . (*(1> + # > + y(1) - «y> - # > - y ( , )), ieKJeK. 
In such a case 
X V/y = x ^ c ' - 1 ' ) - Pi(sw) + /i
(1). (i + /#>), 
jet 
hence, 
^(itf"') = xtfC-1*) + M1' • (i + -# ' ) , 
so that 
(11.10) Xi(




lC(u-l)), if «<l><0. 
Relations (11.10) and (11.11), along with Remark 11.1, follow that the sequence 
{1C(r)}r=Ii u is a weak domination sequence modulo c from C
(u) to 1C(u), and that 
the agreement (K, sK
y, lDK
)) is active in the relation 
^ " ' d o m ^ - ^ m o d c, 
if the agreement (K, sK
}, D(K) is active in the relation 
C("'dom ^"-"mod c. 





(l)) for all ieK. 
It means: if for all agreements (K, s'^, DK
y), being active in the relation 
C(u)dom ^"-"mod c, is B(K
U = 0, then 1C(u) = C(1) = C, and the wanted weak 
domination sequence modulo c from C to C is found. 
If the last condition is not valid, it means, if for some K e JT and some i e K the 
inequality 
x{C(u)) > x^C^) = x^C*-1 ' ) > x;(C
(1)) 
holds, then a new sequence {2C(r)}r=1 „ can be constructed in the similar way, 
which is a weak domination sequence modulo c from 1C(u) = 2C(1) to 2C(u), so that: 
* C(r> = 2 C ( ' W D ( r > ) , r = l,...,u; 
if for all ie J, J e Jf, is 
xi(
1CW) = xi(C(
1>) = xi(C), 
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then 2D{p = lD(p for r = 2, ..., u; if for some K є X, j є K is 
x / C ^ x / t f 1 ) ) , 
then we set for all i e K 
2 ) ^ x ^ " " 1 ' ) - » < $ < " > ) , 
2 ) = m a x { 0 , Xi(C^)-Xi(
2C"-^)}, 
-> = Ą 2 ) . /?<2), 
where 
E^)-^- 1))-^) 
f}(2) = JE5 , 
E/Jf 
jeK 
2d% = ( T T ( K ) ) - 1 . (*<2 ) + /?<2) + r<
2> - * < 2 ) - /?<2> - y<2)) , 
so that , like in t h e previous case, 
x;(
2C<">) = xfC-») + y<;
2) + p\2> = xl2C-iy) + M2) • (1 + B(2)). 
Then for such a coliation K the following relations hold. 
(11.12) if x . fCC" 1 )) ^ xt(C^) for all ieK, then 
x;(
2C(")) = x ^ 1 ) ) = x<C) 
for all i e K, 
(11.13) i f f o r s o m e i e X i s x ^ C C " 1 ) ) > x ;(C
( 1 )), then 
x;(
2C<">) = x f C O - 1 ) ) - x^ 1 ^")) - (n(K))-> . ( I („Xs<«>) -
- t ) , ( S
( " - 1 ) ) ) ) < x , . ( 1 C ( " ) ) , 







These relations imply that after some finite number of such steps, which number 
is limited by m(K), 
m(K) = 





a new sequence of configurations, {C = C(u) = 1C (1 ) , ..., 1C(M) = 2C (1 ) , ..., 2C(U) = 
= 3 C ( 1 ) , . . . , ^ C ' " " 1 ' , »(">#">}, n ( x ) g. m(X), which is a weak domination sequence 
modulo c from C(u) to "(K)C(u), will be constructed, so that B%)K)) = 0 and, con-
sequently, 
(K, 4U>, "<*>_><">) = (X, sy>, _£>) = (K, _-, D K ) . 
Hence, if the described procedure will be repeated n-times, where w can be chosen 
such that 
n = max {m(K) : K e ff — k, and the agreement (K, s%\ _)£•>) is aciiue in rhe 
relation C(u) dom C (u_1) mod c} , 
then "C(u) = C(1) = C, and the weak domination sequence modulo c from C = 
= C(u) = XC(1) to "C(u) = C ( , ) = C is definitively found. , • 
Lemma 11.3. If C = C(s, D)e(S and C = C(s, D') e •? are admissible configurations, 
and if there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C, then there exists also 
a strong domination sequence from C to C. 
Proof . Lemmas 11.1 and 11.2 imply, that if C = C(s, D), C = C\s, Df), C ( ; ) = 
= C(1)(s(1), D(1)) and C t (1) = C t(1)(s(1), D t (1)) are admissible configurations, if 
c = c(C; k) c C n C(1) and cf = c t(C t; &) <= Cf n Ct(1> are their sub-configura-
tions, if the relation C Dom C(1) mod c holds, and if there exists a weak domination 
sequence modulo cf from C t (1) to Cf, then also C Dom C t(1) mod c1". If it was not 
true, then there exists a weak domination sequence modulo cf from C to C t(1) and, 
hence, according to Lemma 11.1, there exists a configuration C = C^,^)^^ 
and a weak domination sequence modulo c from C(1) to C. Then, according to 
Lemma 11.2, there must exist a weak domination sequence modulo c from C to C 
This is, according to Remark 5.5, a contradiction with the supposed relation 
CDom C(1) mod c, and, consequently, the stated auxiliary assertion is true. 
The aim of the following steps of the proof is to form a strong domination se-
quence from C to C. For the idea of this proof is the same as the idea of the proof 
of Lemma 11.2, we introduce only the main steps of the described procedure, with 
the reference to the analogous steps of the previous proof. 
Let 
, { ^ > } r = 1 „ , {c
( '>},= 1 „_, 
be the existing strong domination sequence from C to C, 
C(r) = C(r)(sM D(r)) > c(r) = c«(C(r). #,", > 
C(i) = C ) c
u) = c . 
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There exists a weak domination sequence modulo c(r) from C(r) to C(r + 1), for 
every index r = 1, ..., u — 1. Let us denote this sequence 
K ( ' ^ l , . . . , M ( r ) , 
C(l,l) __ C(D _ C C(l,r) _ C(r) C(m(r),r) _ C(r+1) f ( j r 
f r - 1 , . . . , u - 1 , C ^ - ^ ' " - 1 ) = C(u) = C , 
C(! + 1 - r ) domC ( ! ' r ) modc ( r ) , for f = 1, ..., m(r) - 1 , r = 1, ..., « - 1. 
Let C ( ' r ) = C(!'r)(s(!,r), D ( ! , r )), and let the side payments matrices are 
D w = ( O w W = (4 )) f e 7 , , s Ie^, 
for 
t = 1, ..., m(r), r = 1, . . . , u , (*, r) + (t, u), t = 1, ..., m(r). 
Now, we can introduce new sequences of configurations and their sub-configura-
tions, 
{ 1 C ) } r _ 1 „, r e ' " } . . - i . {
1C ( t-r)} (_1,...,Bl(. ), r = l , . . . , u = l , 
such that 
lC(r) = lC(r)/-s(r); 1 £)(r)\ ^ 1 C((,r) = 1 C(t,r) fg(t,r)M £)(f,r)\ ̂  
icW _ i c W ( i c
w ; . * w ) , f = 1, ..., m(r), r = 1, ..., u; 
lCC"(r),r) = lC(r + l ) ) r = 1 , ..., U = 1 , 
1C(1,D _ 1C(D = C(«) 
The side payments matrices 
*D <" = ( ^ W = (M?)«„ Jei e -*„ , r - 1, . . . , « , 
' ^ - ( ' - I ' V - W W e . , , 
£ = 1, ..., m(r), r = 1, ..., u — 1 , 
are defined in the following way: 
If 
u - 1 
Kef] &(r) 
r = l 
then 
' D g " = _4' ' r ) = D'K = DK. 
If 
u - l 
__ e X - 0 lc(r) 
57 
then we find out the highest value of the index r, 1 _ r _ „ - 1, for which K e Jf — 
- Jfc(r) and denote it by Q(K). For all the pairs of indices (t, r) such that 1 _ r _ _(iv), 
1 < / _ m(r), f 4= m(Q(K)), K e Jf - £(r), we set 
Mr'^wI^))-1.^1^"1'0)-^^)-
_ „.(i _.-!. '>) + „.(,«,))), / e _ _ , _ 6 X . 
If r = e(-K), a r | d if the agreement 
(K, s<r
(r),r), _>_"<r>-r>) = (K, s y '
r + i ) , z>_'r + i )) = 
= ( K , _ ( r + i ) , 2 > r i ) ) = (Ics(K
u),I>(„)) 
is not active in the relation 
C W ' - ' d o m C W ' - i ^ m o d c W , 
then we set 
l._(m(r),r) _ / , ( ! ) 
If r = e_K), and if the agreement (K, 4m ( r ) ' r ) , __"(r) , ,)) is active in the relation 
C (m(r) ,r) d o m C ( m W - l ,r ) m o d c (r) ) 
then we construct the matrix 
!_,(»(,)_•) _ l_,a,r+l) _ i - ( , ) > 9 _ r + ] ; ^ M > 
in the following way: 
For every player i e i_ we define the numbers 
o(j> = A T ^ C W - 1 - ' ) ) - i,;(s<
m(r)'r)), 
/_*> = max {0, „,.(s(m(r''r') + £ _<}> - x^-CG-M--'))} , 
T.1} = ^ 1 ) - M 1 ) 5 
where 
( i ) _ _ * 
w = _.tf} 
jeK 
and then we set 
*_<_ <""> _ - _ y « = « „ ) ) - * . (a(1) + . . > + /.> - «(1> -
- /?(I) - y(1)) = M ? = Vif4) = ̂ . , P = 1 , . . . m(q) , q - 1 , : , . , _ - 1 
The auxiliary assertion, introduced in the first part of this proof, implies that the, 
in such a way constructed, sequence 
{'C"},- . . . . . . - , {4<iW}r_...._-., 
is a strong domination sequence from 1C ( 1 ) = C(u) to 1C(U). 
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The following advance of the proof is similar to the analogous steps of the proof 
of Lemma 11.2. After a finite and limited number of repetitions of the described 
procedure, we construct the configuration nc(m(u~1),u~1) = nC(u) e<€, and a strong 
domination sequence from 1C ( 1 ' 1 ) = C to "C(m(u~i)-"~1) such that "C(m(u~1)'u~1) = 
= C(1) = C, Consequently, the desired sequence is constructed. • 
Theorem 6. Provided f is a coalition-game with fixed cooperation and with finite 
identification, any admissible configuration in T is weakly predictionally stable, if 
and only if it is strongly predictionally stable; i.e. 
< p * * = <p* . 
Proof . According to Lemma 6.1, ^3** => ty*. Let C = C(s', D')e^**, C = 
= C(s, D)e(€ and let there exists a strong domination sequence from C to C. 
Because C e ty**, there must exist some C" = C"(s', D") e <€ and a strong domina-
tion sequence from C to C". According to Lemma 4 and Remark 5.7, there exists 
also a strong domination sequence from C to C and, consequently, the relation 
C p C does not hold. It means that 
$?* = *;, 
and the equality is proved. • 
Corollary. Theorems 1 and 6 imply that Sp* n <€nX 4= 0, whenever T is a game 
with fixed cooperation. 
Remark 11.1, Lemmas 11.2 and 11.3, and Theorem 6 imply that if C = C(s, D)e<g 
and C — C(s, D') e <€ are admissible configurations with the same vector of strate-
gies, and if T is a game with fixed cooperation, then the following equivalences 
hold: 
C e <^rat oCe ^ r a t , 
C e r = ^ o C ' e r = ? r * , 
CeSOroC'e^r, 
Remark 11.2. If T is a coalition-game with fixed cooperation and without identifi-
cation, then the statements of Theorems 2 and 5 may be applied, and the following 
equations: 
$**«¥?-.Pr-{C:CfaC(f,D)6«y, 
* = ( * * W , E ».(*) = max { X i>i(V) : $' e S#} , 
ieK isK 
for all Kerf} = <^rat, 
hold. 
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12. Two-Players Gaines 
The task of this section is to illustrate the proposed prediction method and its 
results on the most simple (and in the game theory best investigated) type of conflict 
situations. 
It is advantageous, for the purposes of this section, to use the notations of the 
previous section 11, with some further simplifications. 
In the whole section we suppose, that 
r=(i,K,{sK}Ke[m, {f*K}mm, {»,}„) 
is a coalition-game with finite identification and with fixed cooperation, and that 
/ = {1, 2}; K = {jf }, j f = {{1}, {2}}. Instead of S^ we write simply s, instead 
of s{i), s{i), M{i) and R{i) we write St, st, 0tt, Rt, respectively. If s = (sx, s2) e S, then 
we write, instead of ( X , s), vt(X, s), C(jf, s, D) and ({('}, s{i), D{i)) (where the side 
payments matrices D and D{i) are necessarily the zero-metrices), also briefly s or 
(sj, s2), vt(s) or t);(sj, s2), C(s) or C(su s2), and (i, st, 0), respectively. 
In order to confront, reliably enough, the results of the proposed prediction 
method with the classical ones, we introduce some notions, usual in the two-players 
game theory, and show their coherence with the notions, introduced in this paper. 
Let us suppose that, for any player i = 1, 2 a real-valued bounded function ht, 
defined on the set s, is given, and that: 
(12.1) if Au A2 are finite, non-empty sets such that s, = s(A;), i = 1, 2, (c.f. (1.3)), 
then for s = (-,, s2) e s the equation 
hi(S) = !S . - (««) - .4.xVl( a l ) • *-(«-) • A<-(st°]) ' 
where 
s [a] = (s™ t SM) e S, s\°\ai) = 1 , st
a](a';) = 0 , a\ e A,, a- 4= a,, 
(c.f. (3.1), (1.5)), holds. 
Functions ht will be called, in the following section, classical pay-off functions. We 
suppose, that the following relation between classical pay-off functions ht and our 
pay-off functions vt holds: 
(12.2) if s = (s l5 s2) e s, and if for iel is (X, s)zRie 0tt, then 
//; (s) ^ vt(s) -= inf {ht(s') : s' = (s\, s2% s[ = sh (jf, s') e Rt\ , 
(compare with Remark 3.3 and with (3.2)). 
If H is a real number, then F is said to be a constant-sum game, if for all vectors 
s e s the equation h{(s) + h2(s) = H holds. 
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If r is a constant-sum game then the vector of strategies s* = (s*, s*) e s is said 
to be a maximin-vector, if 
/^(s*) = max min h1(si, s2) , 
sieSi s2eS2 
and 
h2(s*) = max min h2(su s2) . 
s2eS2 sisSi 
Lemma 12.1. If s# e s is a maximin-vector of strategies, then 
(12.3) D^S^) = max min Aj(sls s 2 ) , 
sieSi s2eS2 
(12.4) u2(s*) = max min /*2(sj, s2) , 
s2sS2 sieSi 
(12.5) vfa) = /.;($*) , i = 1, 2 . 
Proof. According to Remark 10.3 there exists to any s1eS1 such a strategy 
s*(sj) e s2 that 
*i(si, »*(*.)) = min {h1{su s2) : s2 e s2} . 
Hence, according to (12.2), 
*i(si, »*(»»)) ^ «i(*i, «*,(«,)) ^ min {»,(«!, s2) : s2 e s2} = 
= min {*.(*„ -2) : s2 e s2} = ^ ( s , , s*(s,)) . 
This implies that 
(12.6) .»,.(-., .-*(«.)) = min {»,(-., -2) : s2 6 s2} = A.(-,, .-*(-,)). 
Now, we choose the strategy s* e s,, for which 
(12.7) fh{s*, »*(ii)) = max {^(s,, -*(-,)) : », e s,} = 
= max {min {/^(s,, s2) : s2 e s2} : st e s j . 
Relation (12.6) holds even for s*, so that, consequently, 
(12.8) *i(4.*2*(s*)) = B l(s*,s*(st)). 
If there exists s' e S1 such that 




This inequality is a contradiction with (12.7). It means, that 
»i(s*> s*(s*)) = max {min {v^s^ s2) : s2 e S2} : s, e s.} . 
This proves the equation (12.3) and one of the equations (12.5); equation (12.4) 
and the latter of equations (12.5) can be proved analogously. • 
In the following statements, the results of the proposed bargaining prediction 
method (in this case it is a prediction of the strategies choosing) is confronted with 
the results of the classical game theory. We shall verify, how the proposed prediction 
method corresponds with the deep-rooted idea of a two-players rational behaviour 
in a non-cooperative game. 
Theorem 7. If V is a constant-sum coalition-game with two players and with 
fixed cooperation Jf = {{l}, {2}}, then: 
(1) The class of all predictionally balanced configurations tyr is non-empty and it 
contains exactly all the configurations with the maximin-vector of strategies; i.e. 
s;pr = {C : C = C(s%), s„, is a maximin-vector} # 0 . 
(2) Any weakly predictionally stable configuration is strongly predictionally stable; 
$ * * = y*r • 
(3) If s* = (s*, s2) e s is a maximin-vector, and if the strategies vectors s' = 
= (s*, s2) e S and s" = (su s*) e S are not maximin-vectors, then the admissible 
configurations C — C'(s') e % and C" = C"(s") £ ^ are not weakly predictionally 
stable. 
(4) If the game F is, moreover, the game without an identification, the any con-
figuration is weakly predictionally stable if and only if it is predictionally 
balanced; i.e. 
s ? * * = <p* = yr . 
Proof. If s* = (s*, s*2)eS is a maximin-vector, and if C* = C*(s^)e^, then, 
according to Lemma 12.1, is C* = Crat. Hence, there is no C £
 (4 and i e I such that 
Cdom C* mod c(C*;{{i}}). 
If there exists C e ^ and a weak domination sequence modulo 0 from C* to C, 
then: 
either for some i e I is 
Xi(C*)±Xi(C), 
and then 
C* dom C mod 0 , 
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as follows from Lemma 12.1, or 
x,(C») = xt(C), ( = 1,2, 
and then the same sequence of configurations is a weak domination sequence 
modulo 0 from Cto C*. It means, that the relation 
C Dom C* mod 0 
is not true for any C e (€, and, consequently, C* e ty,-. 
According to the well-known classical results (introduced, for example, in [5], 
[7], and [10]) there exists at least one maximin-vector of strategies in any two-players 
constant-sum game. It means that s $ r 4= 0-
If C = C(s) e (€, where s = (su s2) is not a maximin-vector, and if s* = ($*, s*) e S 
is a maximin-vector, then there exists a player in / - without loss of generality we 
may assume that it is the player 1 — for which 
A.(s) <*.(«*) S*i (* i .»- ) 
and, according to Lemma 12.1, 
»,(s) < ^(s*) = A.(s») £ e.(*t, * a ) . 
It means that C 4= Cral, according to Lemma 11.1, and, consequently, C $
 s~$r, 
according to Remark 6.2. The first part of this Theorem is proved. 
The second statement of Theorem 7 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 6. 
Preserving the notations of the third statement of Theorem 7, the relations 
C* Dom C mod c(C, {{l}}) and C* Dom C" mod c(C", {{2}}) 
hold. 
Because C* e % , there is no strong domination sequence from C* to any Ce1^, 
and, consequently, C* p C and C* p C". 
The last statement of the theorem is an immedite consequence of Theorem 2 and 
Remark 11.2. Q 
Even for the more general two-players games with non-constant sum, some as-
sertions may be stated. 
Remark 12.1. If C e <€ is an admissible configuration in a two-players game F with 
fixed cooperation J f = {{1}, {2}}, if C = C(s), C = Cral, and if 
»i(«) + »2(s) = «i(*') + »a(*0 
for all s' e s, then C is a predictionally balanced configuration; i.e. C e *pr. 
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Theorem 8. If F is a two-players strategic coalition-game with finite identification 
and with fixed cooperation JT = {{!}, {2}}, then: 
(1) Any admissible configuration is weakly predictionally stable if and only if it. is 
strongly predictionally stable, and there exists at least one strongly predictionally 
stable configuration, being of the rational character. 
(2) If s* = (s*, s*) e s, s' = (s*, s2) e S, s" = (s,, sf) e S are vectors of strategies, 
if C* = C*(s*) eV, C = C(s') e <€, C" = C"(s") e V are admissible con-
figurations, and if C* = C*„ ( l , s l t 0)e C" - C"ial, (2,s2,0)e C - Cr'a[, then 
the configurations C and C" are not (either strongly or weakly) predictionally 
stable; i.e. 
ctw* = y*, C"^** = **. 
(3) If r is, moreover, a game without identification, then any admissible con-
figuration is predictionally balanced if and only if it is of rational character; 
the class of all configurations with rational character is given by the equations 
* „ . = VT* = *? = %r = 
= {C : C = C(s) e V, «,($) ^ vt(s') for all s' e S, i = 1, 2} . 
Proof. The first and the third assertions of Theorem are immediate consequences 
of Theorems 2 and 6 and Remark 11.2. 
We prove tue second assertion of Theorem for the configuration C only. The 
proof for C" is quite similar. First of all, we construct, for every player ;' = 1, 2, 
and for every identification set R, e 'M^ the non-empty set of strategies s;(R,) <= s, 
using the formulas 
siC#i) = {si : *i e si, »i(si, s2) =" »i(si, si) 
/or a// strategic structures ( X , (s'1; s2)) e /?i} , Rle0t1 , 
S2(R2) = {*2 : s2 e ^2 , »2(sl, s2) ^
 y2(si, s2) 
jor a// strategic structures (X', (s\, s'2)) e R2) , R2e!M2. 
If the strategic structures (jf, s) and (jf, s') belong into the same intersection 
/?i n R2,
 Ri e ^ i , I^2 e ^2> a n d 'f s a ° d s ' belong into the same Cartesian product 
then necessarily 
Vi(s) = t>,(s') , i = 1, 2 , 
and for the configurations Cx = Cj(s) and C2 = C2(s') the equations 
xi(Cl)=xi(C2), i = l,2, 
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hold. Hence, the relation 
Cl Dom C2 mod 0 
is not true. 
Let us return to the configurations C* and C, described in the second statement of 
Theorem. According to Lemma 5.3, the relations 
(12.9) C*domC'modc(C*;{{l}}), C* dom C mod 0 , and 
C* Dom C mod c(C*, {{l}}), 
hold. Let us assume, now, that C e ^3*. Then there exists a strong domination 
sequence from C* to C, which will be denoted 
{ C W W n , { ^ = 1 „ - , , 
C(1) = C*, C(n) = C. The assumption C* = Crat implies that 
(12.10) c(1) = 0 , and C(2) dom C* mod 0 , 
so that there exists a weak domination sequence modulo 0 from C* to C(2). 
Let a weak domination sequence modulo 0 from C* to C(r), for an r, 1 < r < n, 
is constructed. Relations (12.9) and (12.10), together with the assumption C e ^S*, 
imply that there exists an index u, 1 < u <. n, such that c(r) = 0 for all r < u, 
and c(u) 4= 0. It means that a weak domination sequence modulo c(u) from C(u) to 
C(u+i) c o n s j s t s 0f exactly two elements, i.e. 
C ( u + 1 ) domC ( u ) modc ( u ) . 
As the relation 
C ( u + 1 ) domC ( u ) mod0 
does not hold, then C (u+1) 4= Crat
+1), and there must exist such a ( 1 ) C * e ^ , for 
which 
d ) C * n C(„+u _ C(«+i) _ c(„) ; (i)C* _ (i)C*a t 
and 
( 1 ) C * d o m C ( u ) m o d 0 , 
in accordance with Definition 2. 
Let us consider, now, the properties of (1)C*. There exists a weak domination 
sequence modulo 0 from C(2) to (1 )C* and, according to (12.10), there exists a weak 
domination sequence modulo 0 from C* to (1)C*. The relation 
C(2) Dom C* mod 0 
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implies 
( 1 ) C * D o m C * m o d 0 . 
It means that there exists a strong domination sequence from C to (1)C*, it is the 
sequence 
{C, C*, (1)C*} , {c(C; (l,s*,0)), 0 } . 
The assumption C ' e $ * implies that there must exist a strong domination sequence 
from (1 )C* to C. In the case of this sequence we can advance in the same way as in 
the case of the foregoing one, and we can construct, gradually, the configurations 
(0)£* _ £* (1)£* (2)£* __ (m)^* 
which satisfy the following conditions: 
(12.11) ( t )C* = ( t ) C* t , t = 0, 1, . : . , m , 
(12.12) ( t )C* Dom (r)C* mod 0 , r = 0, ..., t - 1, t = 1, ..., m , 
(12.13) if we denote ( t )C* = wC*(s™), t = 0, 1, ..., m, then (12.12) and the proper-
ties of the sets s;(R;), introduced in the first steps of the proof, imply that no 
pair of strategies vectors s(*°, s(#
r), t = 0, 1, ..., m, r = 0, 1, ..., m, r 4= t, can 
belong to the same set S^Rt) x S2(R2), RleM1, R2e 0l2. 
(12.14) The assumption C e *)3* means that we suppose that a strong domination 
sequence from ( t )C* to C (and, consequently, to (0)C*), for t = 1, . . . , m, 
exists. 
The sequence (0)C*, ..., (m)C* can be, by repetition of the described procedure, 
constructed so that for every configuration ( m + 1 ) C* = (m + 1)C*(s(m+1)) e ^ , ( m + 1 ) C * = 
= (m + 1 )C* t , for which there exists a weak domination sequence modulo 0 from 
(m)C* t o (m+i)C*j a n i n d e x t, 0 _ t _. m, exists, such that s
(
c
m+1) and &*0 belong to 
the same set 
_.(_•.) x S2(R2) c S, _ ! e mx, R2e@2. 
But, this is a contradiction with (12.12), and, consequently, there exists no 
(m+i)£*e<j^ (m+i)C* _ (m+i)c* t ; a n d n 0 y^^- domination sequence modulo 0 
from (m)C* to ( m + 1 )C*. It means, together with the equation (m)C* = (m)C*„ that 
there exists no C" e "̂  and no c c ( m + 1 ) c* such that 
C" dom(m)C* mod c . 
Hence, the requirement (12.14) cannot be satisfied for (m)C*. This implies that 
(m)C* P C and C §§ <p?. D 
Remark 12.2. If we leave the assumption, stated in the introductory paragraphs 
of this section, that E is a game with the fixed cooperation Jf = {{l}, {2}}, and if 
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we suppose, now, that T is a game with free cooperation, with the classical pay -off 
functions h(, i e I, defined on the set 
U $x 
XeK 
according to Remark 3.3 and (3.1), and with functions vh i el, given by (3.2), then 
we may use Lemma 6.3 and, sometimes, even Theorems 2 and 3 (if E is a game 
without identification). In such a case, the following statement holds: 
If X 0 = {{1}, {2}}, tfj = {/}, and if 
(12.15) max { £ vfaTt, s):se S*,} = £ max {vt(jf0, s) : e S*0} , 
; = l i = l 
then 
s^** = <p* = yr = {C : C = C(Xj, s, D), C = Crat} u 
u [C : C = C'(jf 0, s, 0), £ xt(C) = max { £ v,(Xj, «») : s* e S^}} . 
i = i ; = i 
If, instead of (12.15), the opposite, strong, inequality holds, then the bargaining 
prediction characteristic in E is the same as if E were a game with fixed cooperation 
K = { j f 0 } , with the same values of pay-off functions ht and vt for all vectors s e S^0, 
and with the same identification partitions of one-element coalitions. 
Remark 12.3. Provided a game f with fixed cooperation K = {jfj}, Jfj = {I}, 
is considered, then the bargaining prediction characteristic is obvious. Such a game 
may be regarded as a game without identification, and, according to Theorems 2 
and 3 and Remark 11.2, is 
S?ra< - «P?* = <B* = ^? r = {C : C = CUTj, s, D) e ? , £ v{Xt, s) = 
iel 
= E ".(-^z. s ' ) for all strategies s' e sXj} . 
iel 
It is unmistakable, according to Theorems 7 and 8 and to the previous Remarks, 
that the bargaining results, obtained by the proposed prediction method, are in the 
considered case of two-players games comparable with the well-known results of the 
classical game theory, as well as with the general idea of the rational behaviour of 
participants of such a game. 
A FEW REMARKS ON BARGAINING MODELS 
The following, conclusive, section of the presented paper contains some remarks, 
concerning the connections between this work and the well-known literature on the 
same subject. 
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(1) Many of the works, dealing with the bargaining prediction in coalition-games, 
are engaged in games without side payments, which games need a qualitatively dif-
ferent approach to the investigated situation. 
(2) Among those works, which investigate the games with side payments, the 
most interesting one (from the our point of view) is the Auman's and Maschler's 
work [1]. This work deals with a game model, which is comparable with the game 
without identification and without strategies choosing, introduced in the presented 
paper. The notion of the rationality is, in [1], analogous to the our concept of ratio-
nality. The bargaining prediction, as such, is , owing to the simple type of investigated 
games, quite easy to survey, its results, however, do not quite correspond, in some 
cases, with the common concept of the players' rationality. The method, described 
in [ l ] , does not eliminate the bargaining results, which we could name „improfitably 
small cooperation", i.e. the configurations, which contain a major number of 
agreements, with the possibility to increase significantly the guaranted profit of their 
players, if these agreements were united. 
The method of work [1] is, on the other hand, very objective, and it is, to a certain 
extent, based on similar idea as the presented work. 
Work [1] deals, among others, with the actual bargaining prediction in three-
players games. The comparison with section 7 of the presented paper illustrates the 
similarity and the dissimilarity, of the both approaches to the investigated situation. 
(3) A rather different approach to the described questions is presented in Harshanyi's 
work [2]. Its author considers games, similar to games with a free cooperation and 
without identification, introduced in the presented paper. 
Work [2] predicts the resultant imputations (i.e. the resultant distribution of the 
profit), however, it does not solve the problem of coalitions forming, at all. It means, 
that work [2] deals with quite another problems than the presented paper, and, 
consequently, even the used methods are quite dissimilar. 
(4) The further connection concerns the function w, on the class ||K||, defined in 
section 7. This function has the properties of characteristic function of the coalition-
-game, which is introduced, for example, in von Neumann's and Morgenstern's 
fundamental work [7]. This is an immediate consequence of the fact, that the coali-
tion-game without identification is close to the games, investigated usually in the 
literature, for which the characteristic function was originally defined, and for 
which it has a real sense. More general games, with more complex identification 
partitions, require even more complicated pay-off functions. It would be possible 
to define, even for such games, some function on the set of all pairs (K, RK), K e \\K\\, 
RK e MK (or of all triples (K, sK, RK), K e \\K\\, SK e SK, RK e @K), as a total of pay-off 
functions vt for i e K. But, such a function would not dispose some useful properties 
of the characteristic function, and, consequently, its introduction would not result 
in any substantial advantage. 
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(5) There are, in [7] (in paragraphs 14 and 51), introduced the notions of the 
solution and kernel of a game, for games with characteristic functions. The classes 
of predictionally stable (strongly or weakly) and predictionally balanced confi-
gurations have some (generally not all) properties of the solution and kernel of the 
game, respectively. There may occur, consequently, the apprehensions, if the intro-
duction of the class *pr of all balanced configurations, gives some new information 
on the game, if the class ^r is not always either empty, or identical with the class ty* 
of all strongly predictionally stable configurations. It is possible, still, to construct 
an example of five-players general coalition-game, or seven-players coalition-game 
without strategies choosing, in which ^3* 4= <pr =j= 0. 
(6) It was already stated in Section 4 that it is possible to introduce even games 
with an infinite identification, i.e. with infinitely many identification sets in identifica-
tion partitions. The assumption of the finite identification is necessary in the proofs 
of Theorems 1 and 8, and in the proofs of some their consequences (some statements 
of Theorem 2. Corollary of Theorem 6, e.t.c). Nevertheless, many assertions can be, 
without any remarkable difficulties, extended even for the games with infinite iden-
tification. 
If we consider a two-players game with the fixed cooperation J f = {{l}, {2}} 
and with all the identification sets R{ e 0tu i = 1, 2, given by the formula 
Rt = {(Jf, s):s = (s;, Sj), st e s,, Sj is fixed} , 
i.e. every player fully identifies the behaviour and intention of his anti-player, then 
the works [3], [4], [8] imply, that there exists at least one configuration C = Crat. 
It is significant, as soon as we want to state an analogy of Remark 12A, or, an analogy 
of the seccond part of Theorem 8. In the last case, we may replace the assumption 
of the finite identification (and, consequently, the existence of only finite number of 
the sets S^Rt)) in the proof by the fact that, according to [4], the set of vectors 
{x : x = (x ;) i = 1 2, there exists Ce^, C = C ra t, 
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